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THE ECONOMICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF
CONVERTIBLE BONDS
WILLIAM W. BRATTON, JR.*
Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of

issuer-bondholder

conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal
frameworks:

neoclassical contract

interpretation;

contract avoidance;

and

corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible
bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of
interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder
interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and
tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract
interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the

frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary
risk of causing substantial costs in the marketplace. Thus, he advocates that
intervention under the latter two approaches be avoided.

INTRODUCTION
The stockholder-bondholder relationship is one of debtor to
creditor, and is pervaded by conflicting interests.1 The management
of a corporation with outstanding bonds 2 can take any number of

*

Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva

University; A.B., 1973, J.D., 1976, Columbia University. A number of colleagues, including
David Carlson, Arthur Jacobson, Paul Shupack a;1d

Eliiott Weiss, provided helpful

comments and criticism.
1.

"Conflicting interests" here mean conflicts between the self interest of an indi

vidual or legal entity and its legal or moral obligations to others. See Anderson, Conflicts of
Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 738, 738 & n.l
(1978).
2.

A "bond" is a long term promissory note issued pursuant to a trust indenture-

the "bond contract" referred to in the text of this Article. A "trust indenture" i,.<; a contract
entered into between the corporation issuing the bonds and

a

trustee for the benefit of the

holders of the bonds. It delineates the rights of the bondholders and the is.<>uer. It sets f orth the
mechanics of payment, states the issuer's sinking ftL'ld obligations and redemption rights,

regulates the conduct of the issuer's business, and defines events of default and the role of the

trustee. See 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCiAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 173-74 (5th ed. 1953).

By channelling the administration and enforcement of all these contract provisions through a
single party, the indenture trustee, the trust indenture makes it feasible to borrow small

amounts of money on a long term basis from large numbers of lenders on identicai terms. See

V.

BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPOR.ATE FINANCE 83

(2d ed.

1979).

In referring to all promissory notes issued pursuant to trust indentures

as

"bonds," this

Article ignores a nicety of corporate practice--the distinction between "debentures," un

secured long term notes issued pursuant to trust indentures, and "bonds," long-term notes
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actions that benefit the stockholders at the bondholders' expense ,
even assuming no present prospect of a payment default. Consider,
for example, a bond issuer that increases its dividend rate and con
comitantly decreases the rate at which it reinvests earnings. This
increases the risk of nonpayment of the bonds and, given a fixed in
terest rate, reduces their value without necessarily reducing the
value of the stockholders' participation in the issuer. A similar effect
might result if the issuer incurred additional debt or substituted
riskier assets for existing ones. 3
Courts traditionally have directed bondholders to protect
themselves against such self-interested issuer action with explicit
contractual provisions. Holders of senior securities, such as b onds,
are outside the legal model of the firm for protective purposes: a
heavy black-letter line bars the extension of corporate fiduciary pro
tections to them. 4 On the contract law side of the black letter line,
judicial response to bondholder requests for protection has been

issued pursuant to trust indentures and secured by a lien on some or all of the issuer's ass ets.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, CORPORATE D EBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON
MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, 1 965, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVI
SIONS ALL REGISTERED ISSUES, 1 967, AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS WHICH MAY BE
INCLUDED IN A PARTICULAR INCORPORATING INDENTURE 7 n.3 (197 1) [hereinafter cited as A BF
CoMMENTARIES] . Most convertible bonds in fact are denominated "convertible debentures."
This Article uses "bond" in accord with its broader usage as the term for all long term
debt securities.
3.
See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 334-37 ( 1976).
Stockholder wealth is maximized if the issuer distributes to the stockholders all capital
which the issuer cannot invest for a rate of return higher than that available to the stockhold
ers elsewhere. Such a distribution might take any one of a number of forms-an ordinary cash
dividend, a spin-off or other distribution in kind, or a payment in connection with a redemp
tion or other repurchase of outstanding shares. In contrast, the issuer maximizes bondholder
wealth if it retains all earnings and other capital which it can reinvest for a positive return.
Distributions to stockholders are not in the bondholders' interest because any decrease in the
value of the issuer's assets increases the likelihood of default on the bonds. See Smith &
Warner, On Financial Contracting, An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcoN. 1 17, 1 2 1
( 1 979 ).
Stockholder-bondholder conflict has been particularly acute where issuers have under
gone fundamental corporate changes. Long term bondholders whose interests have depreci
ated due to rising interest rates seek recovery of face value and seize on any pretext to force
acceleration of their bonds. Conversely, rising interest rates give issuers an enhanced interest
in keeping old, low interest bond issues locked into their capital structures. See, e.g., Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 521 F. Supp. 1 04, 1 1 8 ( S.D .N.Y. 1 98 1 ), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 691 F.2d 1 039 ( 2d Cir. 1 982), cert. denied,_ U .S._, 1 03 S . Ct. 1 253
( 1 983) ( sale of substantially all the assets and liquidation of an issuer of bonds) .
4.
The line, while remaining substantially i n place against holders o f debt securi
ties, has been breached to protect preferred stockholders. See, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel
Corp., 105 R.I. 36, 249 A.2d 89 ( 1969) ( acknowledging possibility of equitable intervention
against unfair treatment of preferred stockholders in merger) . But see Guttman v. Illinois
Central R.R., 189 F.2d 927, 930 ( 2d C ir. ) , cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 ( 195 1 ) .
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shaped by the traditional ethic of creditor self-protection. The
"classical" contract law view that the promisee bears the burden of
obtaining explicit contractual protection has dominated. 5 Protec
tive doctrines from "neoclassical" contract law have rarely found a
place in judicial decisions. 6
This Article takes a new look at judicial regulation of conflicts
between corporate debt and equity interests in the limited context of
the convertible bond relationship. Convertible bonds-bonds incor
porating the privilege of conversion 7 into common stock or other
securities of the issuer-combine debt and equity features in a single
hybrid security. Convertibles reduce conflict between stockholders
and bondholders by creating a class of securityholders whose inter
ests go to both sides of the debt-equity line. Consider an issuer that
revamps its business so as to increase the value of its equity at the
expense of a class of straight bondholders. This result still obtains if
convertibles are outstanding, but now the action also increases the
value of the conversion privilege8 -a result not in the stockholders'
interest. 9 Even so, convertibles do not eliminate all incentives for

5.

See, e.g., Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969); Briggs v.

Southern Bakeries Co., 227 Ga. 663, 182 S.E.2d 459 (1971).
Only when a corporation's business affairs have deteriorated so far as to make fraudu
lent conveyance doctrine applicable does the law directly protect creditors' interests. For the
leading discussion of fraudulent conveyance doctrine in the corporate context see Clark, The
Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV.
6.

L. REV.

505 (1977).

Instead, "business covenants" in standard form bond contracts have been the

predominant means of protecting bondholder interests.
7.

"Conversion" is the act of exchanging one class of securities for another. The

conversion right is created by a contract between the issuer and holder, and the exchange is
effected by a surrender of the original security and the issuance to the holder of a new security
in its place. See Hills, Convertible Securities-Legal Aspects and Draftsmanship, 19 CALIF. L.

REV. 1, 2 (1930). See also Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 243, 279 (1954); Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV.
L. REV. 473 (1961). Denomination of conversion as a "privilege" rather than as a "right" is

both customary, see Justice Field's opinion in Hotchkiss v. National Banks, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 354, 357 (1874), and juridically accurate. See Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock
Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649 (1927).

As a contractual device, conversion remains subject both to business exigencies and the

ingenuity of the subsequent drafter. Bonds and preferred stock are not the only securities to
which a conversion privilege may be attached and common stock is not the only available
underlying security. Bonds can be made convertible into preferred stock of the issuer or com
mon stock of a subsidiary or sister corporation; junior debt or preferred stock can be made
:!onvertible upward into an issue of senior debt. Conversion need not necessarily be optional
with the holder; bonds convertible at the option of the issuer have appeared in the past. See B.

GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS 618 (4th ed. 1962); Hills, supra, at 2;
Kaplan, Piercing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti-Dilution Clauses in Convertible Securities, 33
U. CHI . L. REV. 1 (1965).
8.

See infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.

9.

This diminution in the scope of stockholder-bondholder conflict reduces the

agency costs of the debt portion of the issue causing a lower interest rate and thus making the
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issuer action in derogation of bondholder interests. They m ay even
create new incentives for issuers to take actions that b enefit stock
holders by diluting or destroying the bondholders' claim on issuer
equity. The legal status of these special convertible bond conflicts is
the central concern of this Article.
A longstanding judicial consensus on the treatment of these
convertible bond conflicts disintegrated recently. The traditional
and still widely followed approach turns on the characterization of
convertibles as being wholly "debt" as opposed to being "equity. "
This "debt" or "equity " stage of analysis facilitates instant catego
rization of convertibles inside existing structures of legal doctrine. I t
recurs under the various doctrinal regimes applicable to corporate
securities despite its denial of the convertible's essentially hybrid
nature. Whether the characterization turns out to be " debt" or
"equity" depends on the particular context.10 The " debt" charac
terization traditional in corporate conflicts of interest rationalizes
the court's refusal to intervene: being an incident of " d eb t , " the con
version privilege creates a wholly "contractual" interest in the is
suer; not being "equity" it does not bridge the black letter line sepa
rating bondholders from corporate fiduciary protections. 11 As with
straight bonds, bondholder protection has come from elaborate con
tractual provisions, such

as

the "anti-dilution" provisions custom

ary in convertible bond contracts.
Recently, a number of courts have characterized convertibles as
"equity" 1 2 and have applied a range of protective devices. These

debt portion cheaper from the issuer's poin t of view. Convertible bondholders, then, are not
necessarily irrational when they simultaneously accept a lower interest rate and relaxed con
tractual restrictions on self-interested issuer conduct. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at
353-54; Smith & Warner, supra note 3. at 141-42.
10.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.385-4(a) (1983) with Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a) (1983)
(both debt and equity for tax purposes). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(ll) (1982) (equity for
federal securities law purposes); Klapmeier v. Flagg, 677 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1982) (convertible
bonds issued to insider in exchange for promissory note of issuer held to be debt for purposes of
§ 68 of the old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11
U.S.C. § 553 (1982)). In re Will of Migel, 71 Misc. 2d 640, 336 N.Y.S.2d 376 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(debt for restriction on executor acting under investment provisions of will); AccOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIF1ED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, EARNINGS
PER SHARE §§ 15, 31 (1969) (APB Op. No. 15) (accountants treat them as equity, at least for
purposes of earnings reports).
11.
See, e.g., Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 539-40, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 94, 103 (1979); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219 (Del. Ch. 1 974) rev'd on other
grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). See also Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S.
194, 200 (1942) (warrants).
Commentators have questioned the characterization. See Berle, supra note 7, at 654-56;
Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L RE V. 547, 566-67 (1975).
12.
Compare Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimon: & 0. R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941
(3d Cir. 1982) (plmality opinion of Gibbons, .J.), cert. denied,
U.S._, 103 S.Ct. 475
,

__
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opinions draw on the contractual duty of good faith to support ex
pansive bondholder-protective contract interpretations. Where ex
p licit bond contract provisions have blocked bondholder-protective
constructions, some courts have gone a step further to draw on doc
trines for avoiding harsh provisions and restraining oppressive exer
cises of contract rights. Finally, some opinions cross the black letter
line into corporate territory to assert that issuers and those who con
trol them owe fiduciary duties to convertible bondholders. 1 3
This breakdown of the rigid debt-equity distinction, duly ac
companied by pointed dissents, has taken p lace in the federal courts
of appeals. A panel of the Second Circuit drove the entering wedge in
1975 in Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. ( Van Gemert I ) . 1 4 Although agree
ing on a bondholder-protective resu lt, the panel d isagreed on
whether contract law avoidance doctrines or corporate law fiduciary
duties provided the more appropriate means to achieve it. In

Broad

v. Rockwell International Corp. (Broad I), 1 5 a panel of the Fifth Cir
cuit picked up and expanded upon the Second Circuit's protective
lead, bringing to bear all available tools----eontract interpretation,
restraints on the exercise of contract rights, and corporate fiduciary
duties. On rehearing

en bane ("Broad II"), however, the Fifth Cir

cuit rejected the panel opinion on every point and reinstated the
traditional strict contract positions. 1 6 More recently, the Third Cir
cuit dissonantly raised its voice on the matter in

Pittsburgh Terminal

Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 1 7
This Article discards conclusory "debt" or "equity" analysis
and considers anew the case for going beyond the express provisions
of the bond contract to protect the interests of convertible bond
holders when they conflict with stockholder interests. It asks two
questions: first, whether there is reason to believe that issuers un
fairly advance stockholder interests at convertible bondholders' ex-

(1983) (equity), with Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 940-41 (5th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (debt). Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip
op. at 17 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1981), splits the difference, calling for contract treatment where
the wrong alleged goes to the debt aspects of the convertible bond and for corporate law treat
ment where the wrong alleged impinges upon equity aspects of the bond.
13.

See infra text accompanying notes 186-206.

14.

520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975).

15.

614 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
16.

642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).

17.

680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, _ U.S._, 103 S.Ct. 475 (1983).

Sitting en bane, the same court again split in a related case, Lowry v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 711

F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.), (en bane), cert. denied, _ U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 238 (1983). See aLso Kusner
v. First Pa. Corp., 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976) (convertibles in the context of disclosure
requirements under the federal securities laws).

�l
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pense; and second, whether th e doctrinal dichotomy-corporate law
for stockholders and contract law for bondholders-continues to be
a justifiable part of our system of securities regulation. I t answers
both questions in the affirmative.
Part I of this Article provides a detailed background picture of
the convertible bond relationship . Part I I examines the fairness
question and concludes that much self-interested issuer conduct
against convertible bondholders is unfair, albeit not especially so,
and that judicial intervention against it would cause no significant
economic harm. The Article shows that neoclassical contract theory
provides ready doctrinal justification for such intervention, at least
so long as the risk of the issuer conduct has not clearly been allocated
to the bondholders by the bond contract.
Part I I I examines the question of whether the doctrinal dichot
omy is justified . It finds a weakening of the assumptions on which
the doctrinal dichotomy is based, but shows that the conventional
corporate law model of fiduciary duty is ill suited to the relations of
issuers and convertible bondholders. Thus the Article concludes
that the doctrinal dichotomy serves a useful function and should be
accorded continued, albeit qualified , respect.

I . THE CONVERSION PRIVILEGE--VALUATION AND VULNERABILITY
The bondholder case against self-interested issuer action rests
on two assertions; first, that the action transfers value from the
bondholders to the stockholders; and second, that the bondholders
cannot fairly be deemed to have assumed the risk of the transfer.
Evaluation of these assertions requires a grasp of the complicated
econ omic and l egal u n d e r p i n n i ngs of t h e c o n v er t i b l e b on d
relationship.

A. Valuation-The Economic Background
Convertible bond valuation is a complicated matter involving a
large set of stochastically related variables. The following simplified
model identifies the most significant variables and some of their ba
sic interrelationships. It focuses most closely on the elements of the
value of the conversion premium, paying particular attention to the
variable of issuer call rights. Call rights bear significantly on the val
uation

uncertainties

conflicts.

resulting

from

stockholder-b o n dholder

I
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PRINCIPAL VARIABLES

The issuer incorporating a conversion privilege into its bonds
grants a future claim on its equity. For investors, this future claim
gives convertible bonds the advantage of combining desirable fea
tures of straight bonds, such as fixed income payments and principal
repayment, with the upside p otential of common stock. 1 8 In ex
change for the future equity claim, bondholders customarily accept
a coupon rate lower than that of an equivalent straight bond, 1 9 less
restrictive business covenants, and subordinated status. To issuers,
these concessions give convertibles advantages over straight debt,
such as cost savings, increased future capacity to incur senior debt,
and greater flexibility to advance the interests of the common stock
holders. 2 0 The value of the conversion privilege stems from these
mutual perceptions of advantage.
The following Figure 2 1 illustrates the upside and downside in
terrelations of the three constituent elements of value-- d ebt value,
conversion value, and conversion premium-for a typical converti-

18.
Convertible bonds tend to be used during periods of rising stock prices. They
found favor in the 1 920's, see Garner & Forsythe, Stock Purchaser Warrants and "Rights", 4 S.
CAL. L . REV. 269 ( 1931 ); Keith, Convertible Securities arui Stock Purchase Warrants, 2 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 16, 17 (1929) , and again after World War I I , see Kaplan, supra note 7, at 2 n.3.
Convertibles fell out of favor with bear markets of the 1970's, see Soldofsky, The Risk-Return
Performance of Convertibles, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 198 1 , at 80-82, but renewed interest
came with the bull market of 1 982, see Bettner, Convertible Bonds May Be Right For The Time
But Do Some Figuring Before You Buy Them, Wall St. J., Dec. 1 3, 1 982, at 56, col. 1 .
For the past few years, 300 basis points has been the rule o f thumb on the cou
19.
pon rate differential. See Soldofsky, supra note 18, at 8 1 .
20.
See J . WESTON & E. BRIGHA..'d, ESSENTIALS O F MANAGERIAL FINANCE 592-93
(5th ed. 1 979); Fleischer & Cary, supra note 7, at 474-75; Reiling, Warrants in Bond- Warrant
Units: A Survey and Assessment, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1 41 1 , 1 4 1 9-20, 1424-25 ( 197 2) .
Surveys o f issuers' motivations for using convertibles are numerous. See C . PILCHER,
RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES 22 (1955) (survey of 1948-52 industrial is
sues; 83% of issuers sought delayed equity financing ) ; B righam, An Analysis of Convertible
Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. FIN. 35, 50 ( 1 966) (survey of 196 1-63
issues; 73% of issuers sought delayed equity financing, 27% sought reduced interest costs);
Broman, The Use of Convertible Subordinated Debentures by Industrial Firms 1949-59, Q. REV.
EcoN. & Bus., Spring 1963, at 65 (survey of 1 949-59 issues; delayed equity financing motiva
tion dominated ) ; Hoffmeister, Use of Convertible Debt in the Early 1970s: A Reevaluation of
Corporate Motives, Q. REV. EcoN. & B us., Summer 1977, at 23, 26 (survey of 1 970-72 issues;
34% of issuers primarily sought delayed equity financing, 30% sought reduced interest costs).
Some of the slopes of the curve graphed in the Figure are derived from converti
21.
ble bond valuation curves plotted by the economists B rennan and Schwartz. See Brennan &
Schwartz, Analyzing Convertible Bonds, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 907, 918-23
( 1 980 ) [hereinafter cited as B rennan & Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles]; Brennan &
Schwartz, Convertible Bonds: Valuation and Optimal Strategies for Call and Convers1:on, 32 J.
FIN. 1699, 1710-14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation].
Also, the presentation in the Figure was influenced by the graph in R. H IGGINS, FiNANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 277 ( 1977 ) .

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

674

Market
Value--

--

Conversion
Value

1200

c
z
0
m
LL
0
w
::>

Call Price

1000

Face Value

++++++++++++
Debt Value

800

..J

<C
>

500

A

FIGURE

B

D D

C

E

F

G

VALUE OF FIRM

b le bond 2 2 at various possible values of the issuing corporation. 23

22.

The bond has a 20 year term. Conversion is optional with the holder at any time

over the entire term of the bond. The issuer may redeem the bond for its face value plus a small
premium at any time during the term. The coupon rate is 300 basis points below the rate
available on a comparable nonconvertible bond.
23.

Theoretical option valuation models have been applied to convertible bonds.

Only the nature of the variables identified in this body of scholarship need be noted for pur
poses of this article.
The seminal, theoretical article is Black

& Scholes,

The Pricing of Options and Corporate

Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 637 (1973), which sets forth an equilibrium pricing model for put

and call options grounded in stochastic calculus. See also Cox, Ross & Rubinstein, Option
'
Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7 J. FIN . EcoN. 229, 229-30 (1979); Smith, Option Pricing, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1976).
The model is applied to the problem of convertible bond valuation in Brennan
Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 21; Brennan

& Schwartz,

&

Convertible Valuation,

supra note 21; Ingersoll, A Contingent-Claims Valuation of Convertible Securities, 4 J. FIN.

EcoN. 289 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Ingersoll, Contingent Claims]. This work supersedes a
series of earlier convertible valuation models. The earlier models valued convertibles at the
greater of debt or conversion value at some future point and discounted that amount to
present value. For sophisticated examples,

see

Jennings, An Estimate of Convertible Bond Pre-

Convertible Bonds
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Debt value2 4 is the value of an equivalent straight bond with the
same coupon rate. It is sensitive to the variables dominant in
straight bond valuation, such as interest rate levels and the issuer 's
equity cushion.

Conversion value is t he value of the amount of com

mon stock into which the bond can be converted . It depends on the
market value of the underlying common stock and the price, the
" conversion price," at which the bonds, taken at their face value ,
are convertible. 2 5 If the conversion price is a constant, conversion
value is subject to the same determinants as the stock price, and
goes up and down in lockstep with it. Although arbitrage possibili
ties prevent the bond from selling below the lower of debt or conver
sion value, 2 6 nothing prevents it from selling above the higher of
these two values.

Conversion premium is the amount by which mar

ket value exceeds debt or conversion value. 2 7 If we characterize the
conversion privilege as a long term option 28 on the underlying com
mon, the premium represents the option's value.
Assume that the bond illustrated in the Figure is p riced, issued
and sold for its

$1000 face value with a conversion price of $50. As-

mium, 9 J. FIN. & quANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 33 ( 1 974); Walter & Que, The Valuation of Con
vertible Bonds, 28 J. FIN. 713 ( 1973 ) ; and Weil, Segall & Green, Premiums on Convertible
Bonds, 23 J. FIN. 445 ( 1968). For a simplified exposition under the old model, see J. WESTON &
E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20 , at 593-601.
As applied by Ingersoll, and by Brennan and Schwartz, the contingent claims model
refines but in no sense refutes the valuation relationships derived from intuition and casual
empiricism, illustrated in the Figure. See Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, supra
note 2 1 , at 1710.
The term "debt value" is unique to this Article and is employed for reasons of
24.
clarity. " Bond value" is the customary term.
25.
Commonly set 10 to 20% above the market price of the underlying common
stock at the time of issue, conversion price may remain constant for the life of the conversion
privilege, see Soldofsky, supra note 18, at 8 1 , or be stepped up at stated intervals.
The "conversion ratio" expresses the number of shares of common stock the bondholder
receives upon conversion:
Conversion Ratio

=

Face Value
Conversion Price

For example, a bond with a face value of $1000 and a conversion price of $50 has a conver
sion ratio of 20. See generaliy J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 594 ( 4th
ed. l977); J . WESTON & E . BRIGHA\1, supra note 20, at 591; Ingersoll, Contingent Claims, supra
note 23, at 290- 9 1 .
26.
SeeR. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES I N A COMPETITIVE MARKET 1 9 1 ( 1 971 ) ; J.
WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 596.
See Jennings, supra note 23.
27 .
Otherwise known as a "warrant." See, e .g., R. BREALEY, supra note 26, at 1 9 1 .
28.
Berle defines a warrant a s a corporate issuer's obligation t o deliver its common stock t o the
holder upon payment of a specified sum of money per share upon demand, or within a time and
on conditions set forth in a governing instrument. See Berle, supra note 7, at 649. Less for
mally, a warrant can be conceived of as a long term option on the common stock of a corpora
tion granted for consideration by the corporation itself.
..
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sume further that at the time of the bond's issue the issuer's stock is
trading at

$900,

$40

and the issuer's value is at D. Debt value at issue is

reflecting the convertible's lower coupon rate. Conversion

value is

$80 0, reflecting that the $50 conversion price exceeds the $40

market price of the underlying common. The premium at issue is

$100,

the difference between the higher of debt or conversion value

and the initial

$1000

market price. 29 Valuation at issue reflects the

expectation that the issuer's value will increase substantially during
the early years of the bond's term.30
Looking to the right of D in the Figure, we see the bond's con
version value and market value rising in tandem with higher issuer
values, illustrating the convertible bond's upside potential. Debt
value, in contrast, is limited by a fixed coupon rate and does not rise
significantly. 31 As issuer values increase, the market behavior of the
convertible increasingly mirrors the market behavior of the underly
ing common stock and the premium accordingly becomes progres
sively smaller. Eventually, at G, the issuer's value and the dividend
payout on the underlying common have increased so much that the
expected return on the underlying common exceeds the expected re
turn on the bonds. As a result, the premium disappears and the hold
ers convert.
We see the bond's downside market behavior by looking to the
left of D. Conversion value declines in tandem with the issuer's
value and the premium disappears as the decline in value becomes
extreme. Debt value, protected by the bond contract, shows more
stability and resilience. At B , the bond's market value has fallen so
far as to have become nearly contiguous with debt value; this is the
"bond floor." As the issuer's value goes into extreme decline to the
left of B , even the bond floor begins seriously to give way. With the
issuer's value at A, we reach the end of the line-a hypothetical
bankruptcy liquidation pursuant to which the holders of the con
vertible issue receive

$500

per bond and the stockholders receive

nothing.3 2

29.
Alexander

For a description of the pricing process for new issues of convertible bonds,

see

& Stover, Pricing in the New Issue Convertible Debt Market, FIN. MGMT., Fall 1977,

at 35-36.

&

30.

See generally J. WESTON

31.

If the Figure were to show the convertible's value as a function of different levels

E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 600-01.

of prevailing interest rates, rather than of different firm values, then movement to the right on
the horizontal axis would cause the debt value line to drop.
32.

The bankruptcy risks facing convertible bondholders are discussed in Ingersoll,

Contingent Claims, supra note 23, at 309; Brennan

note 21, at 1710.

& Schwartz,

Convertible Valuation, supra
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ELEMENTS OF THE CONVERSION PREMIUM

We have seen that calculating the conversion value, given a
constant conversion price, is a matter of valuing the underlying
common, and that calculating the debt value is a matter of straight
bond valuation. Valuing the conversion premium, in contrast, is a
matter of valuing the conversion privilege. Sorting out the interre
lated variables which constitute and affect the premium is the cen
tral problem of convertible b ond valuation.
The premium arises, first and foremost, from investors' percep
tion that advantages lie in having two imperfectly correlated ele
ments of value-debt value and conversion value----eo mbined in the
same security. One advantage of the combination comes from the
bond 's limited downside risk. The downside risk of holding the bond
is less than that of holding the amount of common into which it is
convertible because debt value provides a floor should issuer values
decline. 33 The limited downside risk causes the bond to sell for more
than its conversion value even when we are to the right of D' in the
Figure, where higher issuer values cause conversion value to surpass
debt value. But since the relative importance of b ond floor protec
tion decreases as issuer values increase, the premium also decreases
as issuer values increase.
Another advantage comes from the bondholder' s p otential up
side participation. The bond in the Figure still sells at a premium to
the left of D, even though debt value exceeds conversion value at
these lower issuer values. This premium results not from bond floor
downside protection but from the market's hopes that conversion
value has upside potential. Since this upside p otential's relative im
portance decreases as issuer values decrease, the premium dimin
ishes so as to disappear entirely when bankruptcy liquidation is
reached at A. 3 4
The premium also results from the convertible's income stream.
So long as the convertible's coupon rate exceeds the underlying com
mon's dividend payout rate, it is a more advantageous holding than
the common. Indeed , so long as the coupon rate exceeds the dividend
rate, arbitrage p ossibilities will prevent the bond from selling as low

33.

This floor also gives the convertible greater price stability than the underlying

common possesses. One therefore can expect a positive correlation between the size of the
premium and the size of the variance in the price movements of the underlying stock.
34.

See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 597; Jennings, supra note 23, at

33; Walter & Que, supra note 23, at 718; Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at 446-47.

Cost advantages of bond over stock investment, arising from lower brokerage fees and
less restrictive margin rules on bonds, also increase the conversion premium. See Fleischer &
Cary, supra note 7, at 475; Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at 446.
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as conversion value, except immediately prior t o declaration of a
dividend or an adverse change in conversion terms. 3 5 C onversely, as
is the case in the Figure, if the dividend payout rate eventually ex
ceeds the coupon rate at higher issuer values, the premium will be
entirely eliminated. 36
T he premium is also sensitive to the conversion privilege's du
rability-the longer its life, the greater its value. Conversely, the
premium is reduced if the issuer retains the power to shorten the
duration of the conversion privilege. 3 7 Issuers customarily retain
this power in the form of a redemption or "call" right-the right to
pay off the bond prior to maturity at the "call price , " usually fixed
at par plus a small premium .

3. CALL RIGHTS AND CONVERTIBLE BOND VALUATION
Call rights will reduce the size of the conversion premium in
varying degrees depending upon the likelihood that the issuer actu
ally will exercise them. Issuer call p olicies in turn depend on a
number of factors, including bond contract provisions, market re
straints on management actions, and , at bottom, management
awareness.
Most issuers reserve the right to call issues of convertible bonds
at any time. 3 8 The idea is to force conversion at such time as issuer
growth causes conversion value to exceed the call price . Since con
version value is the higher figure, the bondholder converts. 3 9 Forced
conversion through call advances stockholder interests: if the total

'35.

See Brennan & Schwartz, Convertible Valuation, supra note 21, at 1702. Given

the stated condition, the bond always sells above its conversion value and the investor will not

find it optimal to convert at any time prior to maturity, since conversion would result in the

premium's destruction. Id.;

see also B. GRAHAM:, D. DODD & S. CoTTLE, supra note 7, at 607;
Examination of Corporate Call Policies on Convertible Securities, 32 J. FIN. 463,
464 11977) [hereinafter cited as Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies].
Ingersoll, An
36.

At that point, voluntary conversion should occur, preventing the occurrence of

a negative premium.
37.

See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 598.

Thus convertible bond contract provisions affect the valuation calculus by their

effect on the duration of the conversion privilege.
. 88.

Until recently only a minority of currently publicly traded convertible bond

issues contained contract provisions prohibiting call, and even within this minority the pro
tection tended to apply only during the first five years of the issue's life.

See 13 VALUE LINE

CONVERTIBLE SURV. 262 (May 3, 1982).

Due to investor pressure, in 1982 new convertible bond issues began to contain call

prohibitions applicable for the first two years oi the
§ F, at 10, col. 1.
39.

is.sue's life. See N.Y.

Times, Mar. 6, 1983,

On the redemption date both bond and conversion privileges disappear and are

replaced with the right to claim the call price. N�diess to say, the conversion premium disap
pears also.
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value of the issuer is the sum of the value of the debt and equity
claims upon it, then permitting convertibles further to appreciate in
value as the issuer grows p ermits the bondholders' claim on the is
suer's equity to increase at the stockholders' expense.
In theory, then, a stockholder optimal call policy dictates call
as soon as the bond 's conversion value exceeds its call price. 4 0 In the
real world, however, such a call policy would have to permit conver
sion value to rise somewhat higher than that-probably about 20 %
higher 4 1 -in order to assure that a drop in the market price of the
stock during the period between the call and the redemption date4 2

does not discourage voluntary conversion and force the issuer to
cash out bondholders on the redemption date.
Actual issuer call practices fall short of this stockholder optimal
point by a wide margin. The median issuer delays call until conver
sion value exceeds call price by 43 . 9 % , 4 3 a surprising result in view
of issuers' assiduous reservation of the contractual right to pursue a
stockholder optimal policy. One financial economist, not finding a
rational explanation for this phenomenon, concluded that the com
prehensive and symmetric market rationality routinely assumed by
economists44 cannot realistically be applied to convertible bond
pricing. 4 5
A lawyer might take this irrationality to infer managerial negli
gence, 4 6 and such an inference has some empirical sup port. 4 7 This
bondholder beneficial conduct may, however, have a calculated and
rational aspect in cases where the issuer expects to return to the long

40.

See Brennan

& Schwartz,

Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 21, at 910; Inger

soll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 464-65; Ingersoll, Contingent Claims, supra note
23, at 298-99. To the contrary, it is not optimal for the issuing corporation to call the converti

ble when its call price exceeds its market value. The amount paid in excess of market value
would amount to a wealth transfer from the stockholders to the convertible bondholders.
41.

See J. WESTON

&

E. BRIGHAM, supra note 20, at 599; Ingersoll, Corporate Call

Policies, supra note 35, at 466-67.
42.

Trust indentures specify a notice period of 30 to 60 days between the call notice

and the redemption date.
43.

See Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 466. I ngersoll based his

study on all convertible bond issues called between 1968 and 1975.
44.

Market rationality theory assumes that each party, firm, and investor pursues

an optimal strategy and expects all others to do the same. See Brennan

& Schwartz,

Converti

ble Valuation, supra note 21, at 1701.
45.

See Ingersoll, Corporate Call Policies, supra note 35, at 472.

46.

See Klein, supra note 11, at 568-69.

47.

Brigham, supra note 20, at 52. Brigham's study, conducted between 1961 and

1963, found that 23% of the issuers surveyed had an internal policy to force conversion with a

call

as

soon

as

conversion value exceeded call price by 20% . Another 23% of the issuers sur

veyed reported an internal policy to encourage voluntary conversion by raising common stock
dividends. The remaining 54 % did not bother to formulate any defined call policy. Id.

680

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

term debt market for future financing. By letting the convertibles
ride with the common as conversion value surpasses the stockholder
optimal call point, the issuer signals the financial community that it
is less than punctilious in its insistence on its contractual rights. In
vestor confidence that management will take bondholder interests
into account in resolving stockholder-bondholder conflicts of inter
est might well redound to the issuer's benefit in the form of lower
agency costs 4 8 for its next issue of debt securities.
The call problem illustrates the riskiness of investment in the
conversion premium. According to one analyst, it is an average of six
times more risky than investment in the underlying common. 4 9 The
same analyst tells us that the investors exact a high rate of return49% annually-for bearing this risk. 50 These market statistics indi
cate that the bargain embodied in convertible securities, although
peculiar in some particulars, at bottom is sound because an efficient
market correctly perceives the risk and requires a commensurately
big return. This conclusion would not meet

with

approval in all

quarters, however. Legal and financial commentators have been
complaining for decades that the conversion privilege is an inher
ently bad deal for both investors and issuers-so bad that even mar
ket pricing mechanisms cannot mitigate the ensuing damage. 5 1

B . Vulnerabilit1r-The Legal Background
In general, the rational convertible bondholder d oes not exer
cise the conversion privilege until immediately prior to maturity.
Earlier conversion is suboptimal because it fixes conversion value as
an upper limit on the investment's value and thereby sacrifices the

48.

" Agency costs" are costs incurred by the principal in the agency relationship.

They fall into three categories: ( a ) monitoring costs incurred to limit actions by the agent not
in the principal's interests; (b) bonding costs, or the costs of payments by the principal to the
agent to induce the agent not to take actions harming the principal; and ( c ) residual loss, or
the costs of any other decisions of the agent not maximizing the principal's welfare. Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 3, at 308.
49.

See R. BREALEY, supra note 26, at 201.

50.

See id. at 199, 201. The study covered 164 convertible bond issues floated be

tween 1948 and 1963. I d. at 195.

51.

On the legal side, one finds Berle and Means attacking warrants, see A. BERLE &

G. M EANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 200-02 ( 1933), and the early

Securities Exchange Commission weighing in against warrants and convertibles. See, e.g., In
re Childs Co., 24 S . E . C . 85, 1 20-22 ( 1946 ) . Professor Klein's recent work redirects these argu

ments against convertibles. See Klein, supra note 11. On the financial side, numerous com
mentators have questioned the value of investing in convertibles. See 1 A. DEWING, supra
note 2, at 268-69; B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, supra note 7, at 6 01-02; Lewellen &
Racette, Convert·ible Debt Financing, 8 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 777, 784-86, 791
(1973).
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conversion premium. Selling the unconverted bond, in con trast, per
mits the rational investor to realize on both conversion value and
conversion premium prior to maturity.
There are exceptions to the rule, however. If pending actions by
issuers will eliminate the bond's conversion premium or eliminate all
or part of its conversion value, then immediate conversion will be
more advantageous than continued holding of the bonds. Call is one
such action, and issuers usually reserve the right to take it at any
time. Another issuer action-increasing the expected return on the
underlying common so as to be greater than the expected return on
the bonds-benefits the bondholder even while causing the premium
to disappear. Still other issuer actions have the effect of diluting or
destroying conversion value and thus might precipitate preemptive
conversion . These diluent and destructive actions are the source of
the sharpest conflicts between convertible bondholder and stock
holder interests. To the extent the issuer is free to take them, the
bondholders' investment in the conversion privilege is vulnerable to
recapture for the stockholders' benefit.
The following subparts describe and critique the prevailing le
gal model for resolving these conflicts and allocating the risks of di
lution and destruction. The discussion focuses on the analysis em
ployed in this model, its apparent efficiency advantages, and its
persistent shortcomings.

1.

DILUTION , DESTRUCTION AND CLASSICAL CONTRACT

LAW

A number of issuer actions can dilute or destroy conversion
value and give rise to the conflicts that the legal model must resolve.
Conversion value is diluted when the issuer increases the number of
outstanding common shares without proportionately increasing its
vaiue. The result is a decline in the price per share of the common
and , unless an adjustment is made, in conversion value. Stock splits,
stock dividends, and issuer sales of additional common below mar
ket value are the best examples. 5 2 Conversion value is destroyed
whenever, as with a dividend, the issuer disgorges assets for less than
equivalent consideration. The extent of the destruction depends on

52.

Consider a bond with a conversion price of $20. The stock price has risen to $20

from $ 1 5 at the time of the bond's original issue. If the issuer splits the common stock two-for
one, the price per share of the stock drops to $10, destroying much of the value of the conver
sion privilege. The issuer achieves the same result through four consecutive quarterly 25%
stock dividends, assuming its value stays constant during the period. If the issuer were to
mount a successful rights offering to its existing common stockholders, it also could

cause

the

common stock price to fall to $ 1 0 , provided that it priced the shares offered below $ 1 0 and sold
a sufficient number.
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the amount o f assets disgorged . For example, a spin-off o f a subsidi
ary containing half of an issuer's business, halves the value of both
the issuer's equity and the convertible bondholders' claims, yet
leaves the stockholders with a substantially equivalent economic
participation in two entities. 5 3 Total destruction of conversion
value occurs when the issuer, the underlying common, or b oth cease
to exist altogether. This can result from a recapitalization, a merger
or consolidation with another corporation , or liquidation and
dissolution.
Early convertible bond contracts did not include provisions re
specting such diluent and destructive actions. This omission fos
tered a series of cases at the turn of the century dealing with such
issuer actions. 5 4 The cases, still often followed today, 5 5 always re
j ected bondholder claims to the sort of fiduciary protections granted
stockholders. 5 6
In the leading case of

Parkinson

v.

West End Street Railway, 5 7

Judge, later Justice, Holmes characterized the conversion privilege
as "an option to take the stock as it may turn out to be when the
time for choice arrives. " 5 8 T hus pictured, 5 9 the conversion p rivilege

53. A fundamental corporate change, such as the sale of all or substantially all of the
issuer's assets to another entity, similarly might partially destroy the value of the conversion
privilege if carried out for less than fair consideration.
54. See Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry., 1 6 1 F. 472 ( E . D. Wis. 1908) , aff'd per
curiam, 170 F. 1 020 ( 7th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 ( 1909) ( stock for stock exchange
followed by sale of all assets for nominal consideration ) ; Parkinson v. West End St. Ry., 173
Mass. 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899) ( Holmes, J . ) ( consolidation ) ; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Worcester N . & R.R.R., 149 Mass . 214, 2 1 N . E . 364 ( 1899) (same ) ; Day v. Worcester N . &
R.R.R. , 1 5 1 Mass. 302, 23 N . E . 824 ( 1 890 ) ( same) ; Pratt v. American Bell Tel. C o . , 1 4 1 Mass .
225, 5 N.E. 307 ( 1886) ( rights offering) ; Sutliff v. Cleveland & M. R.R., 24 Ohio St. 1 47 ( 1873)
( stock dividen d ) ; Gay v. Burgess Mills, 30 R . I . 231 , 74 A. 7 1 4 ( 1909) ( stock split; stock divi
dend ) . See generally Hills, supra note 7, at 2-4, 3 1-34; Buxbaum, supra note 7 , at 287-88.
55.
See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell lnt'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 944-45 ( 5th Cir . ) ( en
bane) , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) ; Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531,
539, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99-100 ( 1 979) .
56.
The turn-of-the-century corporate law system of protection against self inter
ested actions might have supported implied in law anti-dilution protections had the courts
seen fit to grant corporate status. See, e.g., Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest
and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 36-43 ( 1 966).
57.
1 73 Mass . 446, 53 N.E. 891 ( 1899 ) . Parkinson and two earlier Massachusetts
cases dealing with consolidations, Day v. Worcester N. & R. R.R., 1 5 1 Mass . 302, 23 N . E . 824
( 1890 ) and John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester N. & R. R.R., 149 M ass . 214, 21
N.E. 364 ( 1889 ) , recognize a limited class of situations where the conversion privilege will be
enforced against the successor corporation because the consolidation is a merely formal
change leaving the issuer's capital structure largely intact. According to Buxbaum, supra note
7, at 288, this exception no longer is accepted.
173 Mass . at 448, 53 N . E . at 892.
58.
59. See also Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry., 161 F. 472, 475 ( E. D . Wis. 1 908),
aif'd per curiam, 170 F . 1 020 ( 7th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 214 U.S. 520 ( 1909) .
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more closely resembled the fragile unaccepted offer of contract law
than the bundle of rights bound up in a share of common stock. 60
Corporate law categorization thereby was precluded and with it the
p ossibility of fairness scrutiny of issuer actions.
Once characterization was completed and convertibles catego
rized on the contract side of the line, the turn-of-the-century issuer
had all but won the war. Classical contract law tended to allocate
the burden of drafting an explicit provision to the party seeking to
enforce the right. 6 1 The courts stated that they had no business
making contracts for the parties and that this approach effectuated
the parties' expectations. 62 The reasoning in the convertible bond
cases fell into this mol d . Since the conversion privilege imported no
inherent protection against dilution, parties expecting protection
explicitly would provide for it. 6 3 !vforeover, because the conversion
privilege was a speculation, the courts in ferred that the parties in
tended the bondholder to bear the risk of dilution and destruction. 6 4
Judicial intervention to protect the conversion privilege would de
prive the issuer of the necessary flexibility to initiate fundamental
corporate changes. 6 5
None of this analysis stands up today . 6 6 The characterization
of the naked conversion privilege as a fragile option, while perfectly
felicitous, is by no means inevitable. One can with equal felicity
characterize the premium paid for the conversion privilege at origi
nal issue as an "equity" investment in the issuer and go on from

60.

Stockholder rights accrued only upon the holder's acceptance of the "offer" in

the time, place and manner specified therein. Pratt v. American Bell Tel. Co., 141 Mass . 225,

230, 5 N . E . 307, 3 1 1 ( 1886 ) . Far from conferring stockhoider rights, the conversion privilege
was separate and independent from the bond, albeit physically attached to it. Hotchkiss
National Banks, 88 U .S . ( 2 1 Wall . ) 354, 357 ( 1874 ) ; H ills,

v.

supra note 7 , at 2.

The courts did impose on the issuer an implied duty to use reasonable diligence to keep
the underlying stock available for lawful issuance upon conversion pursuant to the bond con
tract.

See Marony v. Wheeling & L . E . Ry., 33 F.Zd 916, 917 ( S.D.N.Y. 1 92 9 ) ; Bratten v.

Catawissa R.R., 21 1 Pa. 2 1 , 25, 6 0 A . 3 1 9 , 320 ( 1905 ) .
61.

Burton,

Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty t o Perform in Good Faith,

94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 391-93 ( 1 980 ) .
62.

See Farnsworth,

Disputes over Omissions i n Contracts, 6 8 Cou;M:. L .
Omissions].

REV. 860,

862-63, 870 ( 1 968) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth,
63.
( 1899 ) ; Pratt

See Parkinson
v.

v.

West End St. Ry., 173 Mass . 446, 448-49, 53 N . E . 89 1 , 892

American Bell Tel. Co., 141 Mass. 225, 229, 5 N . E . 307, 3 1 1 ( 1 886 ) . Cf. Lis

man v. Milwaukee L.S. & VI . Ry. , 1 6 1 F. 472, 478 ( E . D . Wis. 1 908 ) ,
1 0 20 ( 7t h Cir . ) ,

a.ff'd per curiam, 1 7 0 F.

cert. denied, 2 1 4 U . S . 520 ( 1909 ) .

64.
See Lisman v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W . Ry., 1 6 1 F . 472, 4?6 ( E . D . Wi.s. l908 ) , aff'd
per curiam, 170 F. 1 020 ( 7th Cir . ) , cert. denied, 2 1 4 U.S. 520 ( 1 909 ) .
See Parkinson v . West End St. Ry., 173 Mass . 446, 448, 53 N . E . 891, 892 ( 1 899 ) .
65.
66.

Berie found the old cases uncompelling 50 years ago, proposing that the issuer

be required to "maintain the integrity" of the und erl_ying shares. Berle,
56.

See also Keith, supra note 18, at 32-33.

supra note 7, at 654-
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there to require corporate law treatment of diluent and destructive
issuer actions.
Nor would the issuer win today on the contract side of the line.
Courts no longer confine themselves to classical assumptions about
contract relations. Under today's neoclassical approach, the old ru
bric that the " court will not make a contract for the parties" gives
way to the directive that the parties act in "good faith" so as not to
destroy or injure the right of the other party to receive the fruits of
the contract. The neoclassically inclined court seeks to effectuate the
parties' expectations without a preconceived placement of the draft
ing burden. It assumes that b oth parties are equally situated so far
as self -protection through drafting is concerned-the p romisor can
insist on an express condition just as easily as the promisee can insist
on an additional express promise. 6 7
Finally, subsequent events show that the classical courts proba
bly incorrectly divined the parties' intentions concerning risk alloca
tion. Investors and lawyers quickly responded to the courts' rulings
by developing sophisticated bondholder protective provisions and
making them the norm in convertible b on d contracts. By the 1 920's
these anti-dilution measures contained the principal constituent ele
ments of today's standard form provisions. 6 8 They protect against
diluent and partially destructive actions by triggering proportion
ate reductions in the conversion price. 69 Conversion value remains
unaffected by the action in question as a result. They protect against
destructive events such as mergers, recapitalizations, and liquida
tions by creating a right to convert into the same securities or other
consideration being distributed to the common stockholders in con-

67.

Burton, supra note 6 1 , at 392. See also Summers, The General Duty of Good

Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORN. L. REV. 810 ( 1 982).

68. Hills' thorough description of the provisions of the conversion instrument of the
late 1920's usefully can be compared point for point with the anti-dilution provisions of the
ABF's model indenture. Compare ABF CoMMENTARIES, supra note 2 , at 543-50 ( Sample Pro
vision § 13-6, Alternate 1 ) , with Hills, supra note 7 , at 22-38. Hills' standard provisions re
specting stock splits, id. at 22, stock dividends, id. at 23-24, news issues of common stock, id.
at 25-26 ( conversion price formula) , recapitalizations, id. at 22-23, and mergers, consolida
tions, asse t sales and liquidations, id. at 31-35, do not differ in substance from the provisions in
the model indenture. See also the forms for warrants appearing in Garner & Forsythe, supra
note 18, at 286-88, app.; Keith, supra note 18, at 20-24.
69.
A B F COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 543-57 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6 ) .
A second generation standardized form o f trust indenture recently appeared under the
auspices of the Committee on Developments in Business Financing of the Section of Corpora
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association. This " Model Simplified
Indenture" is billed as a "plain language" form. See Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, American Bar Ass'n, Model Simplified Indenture, 38 Bus. LAW. 7 4 1 , 742 ( 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Model Simplified Indenture]. The Model Simplified Indenture contains
conversion provisions. Id. at 764-69 ( Sample Provisions, article 1 0 ) .
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nection with the particular transaction. 7 0 They remain the norm
today.
This emphatic response implies that parties to the early bond
contracts never contemplated that the conversion privilege has no
protection against dilution and destruction, and that the contracts'
lack of explicit protections did not compel the conclusion that the
parties intended that the bondholders bear the risk. The problem
may not have even occurred to the drafters, the issuers, or the hold
ers. Even if it did occur to some or all of them, the only "intent"
involved may have been a conscious decision to leave the risk
unallocated.
This response also shows that th e courts need n ot have worried
about tying management's hands. The devices just described left
management's hands free while simultaneously preventing transfers
of value from bondholders to stockholders.
The old cases never have been judicially overruled, however.
They survive not because they allocate risks in such a way as to
provide the marketplace with a sound basis for issuing billions of
dollars worth of bonds, but rather because the standard bond con
tract so effectively overrides their allocation of the risks of dilution
and destruction. Consequently, decades passed before b ondholders
had cause to return to the courts to request that the cases and their
restrictive approach be overruled.

2 . EFFICIENCY ADVANTAGES OF THE CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW
APPROACH

The old cases extended an implied invitation to the market
p lace to come up with its own express alternative allocation of risks.
And just as the marketplace response explains the survival of the old
cases, so might it also justify future adherence to them. I f the stan
dard form b ond contract both efficiently allocates the risks of dilu
tion and destruction and adequately protects the bondholders' ex
pectations, no further supplemental or regulatory judicial action
may be necessary, even under a neoclassical approach.

70.
See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 528-30, 547, 549-50 (Sample Provisions §§ 13-6 ( C ) , Alternate 1 and 1 3-6 ( G ) , Alternate 1 ) . See also Model Simplified Indenture,
supra note 69, at 755 ( Sample Provision 5.01 ) .
Advance notice requirements provide a lesser order o f protection. Like call notice provi
sions, these permit the holder to realize the bond's conversion value prior to consummation of
the diluent or destructive action. They afford cold comfort if the conversion price exceeds the
conversion value.
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The turn-of-the-century cases in effect .chose standard form
contract terms over judge-made rules as the mode for allocating the
risks of convertibility. Standard form contracts serve the same risk
allocating functions with respect to some publicly-traded securities
that contract law gap-filling rules and judge-made and statutory
provisions of corporate law do with respect to others. Standard
forms save costs by filling in terms of the relationship when

sui

generis negotiation is too expensive, and by facilitating efficient mar
ket pricing. On the latter point, consider the case of bonds. If traders
safely can assume that known standard provisions govern each
bond, they can value the b ond based on a smaller and more manage
able set of variables without inspecting the contract governing the
particular issue. 7 1
Standard form anti-dilution provisions doubtless have per
formed these risk-allocating functions as efficiently as judge-made
rules would have done. Indeed , there are many reasons to conclude
that the contractual mode is the more efficient choice. D evelopment
of a precise system of corporate law anti-dilution rules might very
well have b een difficult and costly as courts took the time to choose
between competing anti-dilution theories. In con trast, contractual
anti-dilution provisions have proved comparatively inexpensive.
Most of the costs of their development were incurred prior to 1 929,
and the marketplace has been reaping positive returns on the invest
ment ever since, as the corporate bar has merely used the same form
over and over again. A few material changes in the form have been
introduced gradually, 7 2 and only a minimal amount of litigation re
specting the form has been reported . 7 3
Today's standard form bond contract apparently continues to
save costs. I t achieves a degree of clarity and certainty which ap
proaches that of a statutory scheme and which a corporate law anti
dilution system, whether based on arbitrary line-drawing or on judi
cial intuitions of fairness, could not equal . The American B ar Foun-

71.

See RESTATE.\!:ENT ( SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment a ( 1 981 ) ; Llewellyn,

What Price Contract?-A.n Essay in Perspectit,e, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 721 . 731 ( 193 1 ). See also

Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L . REV.
629, 631 ( 1943 ) . The process works differentiy for privately placed long-term debt !"e{!urities.

These are sold in large denominations to smali numbers of institutional investors and most of
their governing provisions are heavily negotiated.
72.
The principal changes are discussed infra notes 76, 1 1 1 , 1 70, and text accompa
nying note 86.
73.
See Hills, supra note 7, at 1. According to Hills, .3 0 cases concerning the conver
sion privilege were reported during the period 1860-1880, and another 30 cases during the
period 1880-1930. Research done in connection with the preparation of this Article suggests
that less than 30 such cases have reached appellate courts since 1930 (excluding tax cases and
cases raising issues only under the federal securities laws ) .
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dation's readily available Model Indenture precisely "restates" the
standard form. 74 A high degree of uniformity exists among the pro
visions governing different issues of bonds, as was shown by a survey
of trust indentures covering convertible bonds first issued and sold
between October 1 , 1981 and September 3 0 , 1 982, made in connec
tion with the preparation of this Article. 7 5
The history of standard anti-dilution provisions shows that the
form also has been responsive to shifting market conditions. The
standard provisions draw fine lines between stockholder and bond
holder interests, some of which have been redrawn as views on the
overall function of anti-dilution provisions have changed . 7 6 Such
developments show that the marketplace actors who generate these
standard risk allocations, whether they be issuers, market traders,
or market intermediaries such as underwriters and corporate law
yers, 7 7 can arrive at precise and well-considered answers to anti-di
lution questions, despite standardization.

74.
See supra note 69.
Forty-six trust indentures were surveyed, covering convertible bonds publicly
75.
issued between October 1, 1981 and September 30, 1982. To cite one example of their uniform
ity, 43 of the 46 contained "market price" clauses covering subsequent issues of common
stock.
76.
For example, during the last 25 years the once universal "conversion price"
clause covering new issues of common stock and rights to acquire common stock has almost
entirely disappeared from public issue bond contracts to be replaced by a "market price"
clause covering a smaller class of transactions.
The discarded "conversion price" formula provided for downward adjustment of the
conversion price whenever stock was sold below the conversion price. For further explanation,
see ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 530-3 1 . This approach reflected the financial com
munity's original conception of the conversion privilege as an option on a specified proportion
of the issuer's earnings. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 18 n.27. This percentage ownership con
cept went into eclipse in the 1950's and 1960's and was replaced by two distinct notions. The
first was that what needed protection in convertible bond contracts was not a percentage
ownership claim but the current market level of conversion value and conversion premium.
The second notion was that anti-dilution provisions should operate only when stockholders
receive a benefit at the bondholders' expense, and that otherwise there should be parity of
treatment. Id. at 20, 21 n.3 1 . "Market price" anti-dilution clauses followed from these no
tions. At their narrowest, market price clauses provide for downward adjustment of the con
version price only in response to below market offerings of new stock and rights to existing
common stockholders. For further explanation, see ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 53233. See also Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 766 ( Sample Provision 10.07 ) ;
Kaplan, Some Purther Comments o n Anti-Dilution Clauses, 2 3 Bus. LAW. 893 ( 1968).
I n the survey undertaken in connection with the preparation of this Article, all but five
of the trust indentures contained the market price formula in the narrow version. See supra
note 75.
The rise of the market price formula prompted a spirited debate over its merits. Com
pare Kaplan, supra note 7, with Ratner, Dilution and Anti-Dilution: A Reply to Professor
Kaplan, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 496-97 ( 1966 ) .
77.
Some changes i n the drafting o f convertible bond contracts clearly have
stemmed from investor demands on underwriters for additional protection. See N .Y. Times,
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Finally, being contract terms, standard form provisions can re

spond to the aberrant case more flexibly than can judge-made and
statutory provisions. Indeed , antimdilution protection can be quite
sensitive to exercises of bargaining power. In a heavily negotiated
private p lacement of convertible b onds, the holder's bargaining
strength 7 8 might be manifested by anti-dilution provisions offering
less flexibility to the issuer than the "standard" scheme. 79
If, indeed , standard form contracting protects convertible
bondholder interests and allocates risks of dilution and destruction
more efficiently than common law processes would have done, then
standard anti-dilution provisions probably would have come into
existence even if the early courts had been more interventionist.
Judge-made b ondholder protective rules need not, and probably
would not, have been formulated as unwaivable rules entirely
grounded in fiduciary concepts of fairness. They more likely would
have functioned as equitable gap-fillers, subject to variation by
agreement. 80 Given the usual uncertainties which attend the devel
opment of judicial rules, the marketplace would have found it cost
effective to force the judge-made rules to yield to its own more pre
cise formulations. In sum , classical judicial restraint and the mar
ketplace contracting process have interacted ·with apparent success
to alloc.ate the risks of dilution and destruction. The burden to j us
tify j udicial intervention is correspondingly high.

3.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW APPROACH
RESIDUAL RISKS OF DILUTION AND DESTRUCTION

Under the classicai approach, the drafter who wants to prevent
a

given risk of d ilution or destruction from being automatically allo-

supra note 38, § 3, at 10, col. 1, concerning the rapid standardization of two year call prohibi

tions in response to investor pressure. In the case of the transition from conversion to market
price formula, discussed supra note 76, the im�tus for change could just as easily have come
from market intermediaries and changes in their notions of reasonableness and fairness as
from the exercise of economic power between buyers and sellers.
78.
Private placements of debt securities tend to take place among medium and
small sized issuers and institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds,
sufficiently large and sophisticated to appraise the risks entailed. See generally V. BRUDNEY &
M . CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 2, at 121-22.
79. For example, destructive actions such as mergers and liquidations could be pro
hibited entirely. An emint:nt law firm recommends that anti-dilution clauses in private place
ments forbid triangular mergers where neither the surviving corporation nor its ultimate par
ent is publicly traded. Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates, Investments in Warrants and
Convertibies 17 (June 1 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Debevoise, Plimpton, Investments in
Convertibles].
80.
See Anderson, supra note 1 , at 753-54; Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1 089, 1 090 ( 1 981 ) .
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cated to the bondholders must foresee, identify, and deal with the
risk explicitly. This is a considerable task, since any change in the
issuer's equity structure, asset base, or identity creates a risk of dilu
tion or destruction. Whatever its efficiency advantages, today's
standard public-issue form does not attain this ideal of a complete
contingent contract. It covers the most likely contingencies and
many unlikely contingencies as well, but it neither covers all foresee
able types of diluent or destructive action, nor provides explicit in
structions for treatment of all of the variant situations which can
arise respecting issuer actions that are covered. 8 1 Any one of these
untreated residual contingencies can seriously erode the value of the
conversion privilege. Not surprisingly, much of the last decade's
convertible b ond litigation has concerned these residual risks. A few
examples of these risks follow.
Included among the residual risks is the creation of a new class
of preferred stock, and its offer on a rights basis to existing common
stockholders on attractive terms. The higher the dividend rate on
the new preferred, the greater the diminution in value of the com
mon stock and , hence, of the conversion privilege. 82 The standard
form' s failure to include a clause dealin g with this d evice is surpris
ing and commentators have flagged the dangers of the omission. 8 3
Another diluent device, not anticipated until recently by the
standard form, is the spin-off of the stock of subsidiaries, which be
came popular after World War I I . 8 4 Spin-offs hold out the possibil�
ity of substantial or total destruction of conversion value, depending
on the size of the subsidiary spun off. Yet even in the early 1 970's

81.
See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
Certain minor diluent actions, such as the issue of stock pursuant to an employee stock
option plan, are treated in the standard provisions, but are excepted from their anti-dilution
protections. See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 7 n.15.
See Kaplan, supra note 7 , at 17-18. While the anti-dilution provisions in the
82.
A BF's model indenture fail to pick up burdensome preferred, they easily could be adjusted to
do so through extension of the definitions of " Common Stock" and "Additional Stock" to
cover designated new issues of preferred. See A B F COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 541, 54445, 550-5 1 ( Sample Provisions §§ 13-1 and 13-6, Alternates 1 and 2 ) .
8 3 . A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 5 1 , a t 202; Kaplan, supra note 7 , at 17-18.
The device has been used with devastating effectiveness to impair the value oi issues of
preferred stock. See Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp. , 53 F. Supp. 198 ( D . Del. 1943 ) , aff'd,
146 F. 2d 701 ( 3d Cir. 1944) (creation of senior issue of preferred stock exchangeable for ex
isting preferred as device to eliminate existing preferred's dividend arrearages) .
84.
The device was not new, however. See Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Off, 1 967
D uK E L.J. 1 , 3-6. The Securities Exchange Commission became concerned about the device's
increased use in the late 1960's. See Securities Act Rei. No. 4982 (July 2, 1969 ) , reprinted in
FED. SEC. L . REP. ( C C H ) � 77,725 ( 1 969-7 0 ) .
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many anti-dilution provisions made n o mention of spin-offs. 8 5 The
financial community and corporate bar have since apparently be
come fully aware of this risk and have determined that the b ond
holders should not bear it. All of the recent anti-dilution provisions
surveyed in connection with the preparation of this Article provided
for conversion price adjustments in respect to spin-offs. 8 6
Other residual risks arise when standard contract language is
applied to cases coming within its literal scope, but not foreseen in
all particulars by the original drafter. 8 7 The application of standard
merger language in the context of a cash out merger provides an ex
ample. The language was first formulated in the 1 920's, and contin
ues to be used today in substantially similar form. 88 It p rovides a
right to convert the bond "into the kind and amount of stock, secur
ities or assets receivable upon such . . . merger . . . by a holder of
the number of shares of Common Stock into which such [bond]
might have been converted immediately prior to such . . .
merger . . . . " 8 9 Literal appliction of this language in the case of a
cash out merger freezes the value of the conversion privilege and

destroys its upside growth potential. This question of contract inter
pretation was the subject of the

B road

v.

Rockwell International

Co rp. 90 litigation and is dealt with in detail below. 91
The standard form's limitations and the resulting residual risks
have not escaped the notice of the corporate bar. The bar has de
vised the so�alled "good faith" anti-dilution provision, designed to
d ispose of the entire problem. This provision catches all actions not
otherwise covered wh ich "materially and adversely affect the con
version rights of the . . . holders, " 9 2 thereby shifting the residual

85.

See 1 VALUE LINE C ONVERTIBLE BoND SERV. 3 (Dec. 9, 1968 ) . Resulting litiga

86.

See supra note 75. Examples of anti-dilution provisions fully covering spin-offs

tion is discussed infra

notes

1 0 1 -26.

can be found in A B F COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 553 ( Sample Provision § 13-6( C ) , Alter
nate 3) and in the Model Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 766-67 ( Sample Provision
H l. 08 ) .
87.

nate 1 ) .

See also infra note 99 and accompanying text.

88.

See Hills, supra note 7 , at 35.

89.

ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 550 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6 ( G ) , Alter

90.

614 F.2d 418 ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) , vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th

See also 1viodel Simplified Indenture, supra note 69, at 755 ( Sample Provision 5 . 0 1 ) .

Cir. ) ( en bane ) ,

cert.

trust indenture ) .

One

denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 198 1 ) .
91.
92.

See infra note 1 0 3 and accompanying text.

Kaplan, supra note 7 , at 18 n.27 ( q uoti ng provision f rom

law finn comments that "This (type of provision] may seem like lazy lawyering, but in an area
as

complex

a.s

this we believe such a provision is the better part of d iscretion . ' ' Debevoise,

Plimpton, Investments in Convertibles, supra note 79, at 17.
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risk from the bondholders to the issuer, and overriding the results of
the turn-of-the-century cases.
The good faith clause has not found its way into the standard
form, however. Thus, the door remains open to judicial intervention
for the protection of bondholders in the convertible bond context.
IL JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE CONVERTIBLE BOND
RELATIONSHIP-THE VEHICLE OF INTERPRETATION

This Article now turns to the question of whether some expecta
tions arising from the convertible bond relationship , although un
protected in the bond contract, are important enough to j ustify judi
cial intervention. The analysis is divided into two parts . The first
part sets forth the doctrinal framework for intervention-neoclassi
cally expanded contract interpretation. The following part consid
ers the appropriate judicial allocation of the risks respecting con
vertible bonds, centering upon the operation of the bond market,
and its place in shaping and limiting the expectations of issuers and
holders.

A . Interpretation and Intervention
Judicial intervention into contractual relationships often oc
curs within the doctrinal framework of contract interpretation. 9 3
When

a

contract is ambiguous, the court called upon to enforce it

must intervene to clarify the meaning of its terms or to fill in such
terms as the parties failed to include. The degree of judicial inter
vention varies with the situation. The more ambiguous the contrac
tual language, the more the court must serve as the relationship 's
law giver.
In making protection of the parties' expectations the goal of the
interpretive process, contract law tries to let the parties define the
fair result for themselves94 and to limit judicial intervention. But
such limited intervention is not always possible . In some cases
neither text nor context provides a reliable indicator of the parties'
expectations, leaving to the court the entire j ob of formulating law
for the relationship . Here a court might impose its own conception
of fairness by finding the result which best preserves equivalence in

93.
The discussion in the text is distilled from Bratton, The Interpretation of Con
lmcts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZD L. REV. 371 ( 1984 ) .
94.
For a definition of fairness keyed t o the parties' expectations, see Anderson,
supra note 1 , at 7 46 n . 25 .
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the values exchanged by the parties. 9 5 Or it might subordinate the
merits as between the particular parties and look for the most effi
cient result . 9 6 On this latter level of inquiry, minimal future transac
tion cost and maximal marketplace certainty are p aramount
considerations.
The degree of intervention also varies with the court's doctrinal
approach to interpretation. Classical contract doctrine 9 7 tends to
confine the court to linguistic, structural, and textual analysis
bounded by the "four corners of the document. " Neoclassical analy
sis, based on the insight that texts do not have immutable meanings,
is more expansive. It bids the court to consider the entire circum
stances of the relationship to assure selection of the meaning most
consonant with the parties' expectations. 9 8 Through freely interpo
lated good faith duties, neoclassical interpretation also brings ethi
cal restraints to bear on self-interested conduct damaging to the in
terests of other parties to the contract .
Courts tend to draw on classical contract law principles when
interpreting bond contracts. They assume that each clause of an ex
haustively drafted document, such as a bond contract, embodies an
exact allocation of risk. As a result they tend to interpret bond con
tracts in search of a hidden, true meaning to be found by applying

the correct. classical interpretive calculus. But these judicial percep

tions

are

inaccurate. A limited classical approach to bond con tract

interpretation often fails to p r ot ect some of the

expectations

at

stake.

Issuer and bondholder

expectations

d o not coalesce around an

easily ascertainable standard usage in every case. Even all the law
yerly

lavished on the standard form trust indenture d oes not
guarantee the absence of vagueness and ambiguity. 9 9 In addition,
care

See Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 873.
See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros . , 64 F.2d 344, 346 ( 2d Cir. 1933) (L.
Hand , J . ) ; Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 878-79; B urton, supra note 6 1 , at 392-94.
97.
See Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 ( S . D . N . Y . ) (L. Hand, J . )
a.If'd, 201 F . 664 ( 2d Cir. ) , a.ff'd , 2 3 1 U . S . 5 0 ( 1 91 1 ) ; Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpreta
tion, 12 HARV. L. REV. 4 1 7 ( 1 899 ) .
95.

96.

98.

The usual indicators are brought to bear-the contract language, the parties'

negotiations, recitals, courses of dealing, usages of trade, and so forth.

See Farnswort h , Omis

s·ions, s·upra note 62, at 877.
99.

Examples of poor drafting abound in cases that arose before the achievement of

today's degree of standardization.

See Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. New York Trust

Co., 184 F.2d 954 ( 2d Cir. 1950) ( poor drafting involving exercise price of warrants in case of
stock dividen d ) ; Mueller v . Howard Aircraft Corp., 329 Ill. App. 570, 7 0 N . E . 2 d 203 ( 1 946)
(ambiguity concerning redemption caused bondholder to escape cal l ) .
For a more recent example o f poor drafting see, Sharon Steei Corp. v . Chase Manhattan

Bank, N . A . , 691 F.2d 1 039 ( 2d Cir. 1982 ) ,

cert. denied, _ U.S. _ , 1 03 S . C t . 1253 ( 1 983 ) .
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possibilities for error abound whenever the standard form is modi
fied to suit the requirements of a particular transaction . Such errors
easily can create situations in which a classical interpretation, based
on standard English usage or the document's apparent regulatory
scheme, does not accord with the market's expectations concerning
the contract's meaning. 1 00
Similar variances can arise in routine transactions when unfore
seen events come within the literal scope of long-standing standard
language. Such a situation arose in

Broad v. Rockwell International
Corp. 1 0 1 and a number of similar convertible bond cases. 1 0 2 In these

cases involving cash mergers, issuers applied the standard anti-dilu
tion provision for carry over conversion rights in mergers so as to
limit the bondholders' future conversion rights to the amount of the
cash consideration offered in the merger. The issue was whether the
cash was " other property" within the meaning of a standard clause
providing for carry over conversion rights into the "stock, securities
or other property" receivable in the merger by the underlying com
mon . 1 0 3 Under one standard usage , "property" includes "cash . "

1 00 .

See, e .g . , Harris v. Union Elec. C o . , 622 S.W.2d 239 ( Mo . App. 1 981 ) .

101.

6 1 4 F.2d 4 1 8 ( 5th Cir. 1 980 ) , vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5t h Cir . ) ( en bane ) , cert.

denied, 454 U . S . 965 ( 1 981 ) .
1 02.

See Brucker v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Europe N.V., 424 F . Supp. 679 ( S . D . N .Y .

1 976 ) , a.ff' d, 5 5 9 F . 2 d 1202 ( 2d Cir. 1 97 7 ) (approving settlement agreement in injunctive ac
tion by convertible bondholder against short form merger ) . Cj. Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 3 6 1 ( D . Del. 1 97 5 ) ( warrantholder challenge to short form merger ) . B r oenen v. Beau
nit Corp . , 440 F.2d 1 24 4 ( 7th Cir. 1970 ) and Levine v. C hesapeake

& O .R.R., 6 0 App.

Div. 2d

246, 400 N .Y.S. 2d 76 ( 1 977 ) , concern the status of convertible bondholders following tender
offers.
B .S . F . Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 42 Del. Ch. 1 06, 204 A.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1964 ) ,
concerned the sale for cash of 7 5 % o f the assets o f a n issuer o f convertible bonds. The pur
chaser of the assets did not grant conversion rights into its stock, even though the trust inden
ture provided that in case of a sale of assets or merger the bonds would be convertible into
common shares of the issuer or common shares of the acquiring company. The court heid that
this language was unambiguous, and would apply only in a case where stock of the purchaser
was consideration for the assets. The court reasoned that since the issuer added the cash con
sideration to its asset base, and the bondholder could participate in it by converting into

common stock, the transaction did not prejudice the holder. Id. at 750-52.

The court's analysis must be questioned. The language aLso could be read to require a

choice of conversion into the issuer's or purchaser's stock. Moreover, if all of the assets with

upside potential were sold for cash and the cash remaining after provision for payment of the
bonds transferred to the stockholders by means of a dividend, then the bondholders in effect

would have been deprived of most of their conversion value. On the other han d , if the cash

were reinvested in equities or some other volatile asset, then the bondholders really would not
have any cause to complain. Given the lack of clarity and the bondholders' vulnerability, the
court appropriately could have decided the case in their favor.

Another issue of interpretation presented in B . S.F. Co. is discussed in Bratton, supra

note 93, at 386-87.
103.

6 1 4 F.2d 4 1 8

dem:ed, 454 U . S .

965

( 5th

Cir. 1980 ) , vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir . ) ( en bane ) , cert.

( 1 981 ) . The tr;Jst indenture in Broad provided for the r ight to "convert
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The Broad I1 1 0 4 court so held, taking a rigidly classical approach
based on the "plain meaning" 1 0 5 of the language read within the
confines of the document.
Consideration of the origin of the language at issue in Broad II
shows that rigid adherence to standard usage readings led the court
to overlook inherent vagueness and ambiguity in bond contract lan
guage. The language in question was first formulated in the 1920's,
at about the time that Florida became the first state to p ermit cash
mergers. 1 0 6 I t was many years, however, before cash consideration
statutes achieved general application . Although California followed
Florida in 1 93 1 , 1 0 7 it was not until 1961 and 1 967, respectively, that
New York and D elaware followed suit. 1 0 8 At the time the trust in
denture in Broad II was executed in 1 967, the issuer' s state of incor
poration, I owa, did not provide for cash mergers. 1 0 9
Since, for all intents and purposes, cash out mergers did not ex
ist in the 1920's, 1 1 0 the anti-dilution language in Broad II could not
originally have been formulated with a cash out merger in min d . O f

. . . into the kind and amount of shares o f stock and other securities and property receivable
upon such . . . merger. " 642 F.2d at 949.

Kaplan finds standard form merger ciauses such as that at issue in Broad so general

as

to

be incapable of yielding predictable results. Kaplan, supra note 7 , at 16. According to Hills:
"[I]t has been found impossible to draft a satisfactory provision protecting the conversion
privilege . . . from dilution upon the issuance of additional shares by a successor company."
Hills, supra note 7 , at 36.
1 04.
105.

642 F.2d at 948-51 .

By "plain meaning" the Broad I I and other courts in bond cases refer not to the

classical corollary to the parol evidence rule under which extrinsic evidence of meaning is
excluded when the contract language is

elear

on its face, see E . FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, §

7 . 1 2 at 501-03 ( 1 982 ) , but to the primacy of interpretation according with standard usage and
the var ious rules of interpretive preference. See, e.g., B .S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank,
42 Del. Ch. 106, 204 A.2d 746 ( Sup. Ct. 1 964 ) ; Mueller

v.

Howard Aircraft Corp. , 329 I ll. App.

570, 577-78, 70 N . E . 2d 203, 206-07 ( 1 946 ) ; H arris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W. 2d 239, 247,
250 ( Mo. App.
1 06.

1981 ) .

Act o f JW1e 1 , 1925, c b . 1 0 , 096, § 36, 1925 Fla. Laws 134 (current version a t FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 607.214 ( West 1977 ) ) .
107.

General Corp. Law, ch .

862,

§ 361, 1931 Cai . Stats.

1809

( current version at

CAL. CORP. CODE § l l O l ( d ) ( W est 1977 ) ) .
108.

See WeiBS, The Law of Take Ou;, Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 5 6 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 624, 637-41 ( 1 981 ) . New York first permitted cash consideration in the context of short

iorm mergers ( involving utility companies only) in 1936. Id. at 641 . New York extended its

statute to include all corporations in 1949 and in 1961 authorized cash, long form mergers.

Delaware enacted a short form statute, modelled on New York's law, in 1957, then extended
the statute to include iong form mergers in 1967. Id.
109.

642 F.2d at 95 1 . Iowa amended its law to permit cash consideration in i970.

The Fifth Circuit correctly notes in Broad II that the unavailability of cash mergers is

not a credible basis for determining that the parties did not "intend" cash to fall within the

scope oi "property" in the merger provision. Id. ·when the problem occurs to no one, there is
no

subjective intent.
110.

The

c.ase

oi Florida corporati ons is taken

as

de m'inimis.
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course, it reasonably might be inferred from the language's verbatim
survival for five decades, from the gradual proliferation of the cash
out merger, and from expectations of literalistic judicial interpreta
tion, that the language survives unmodified because of a conscious
allocation of the cash out merger risk to the bondholders. But it just
as reasonably might be inferred that the standard form 's failure spe
cifically to mention cash out mergers reflects decades of thoughtless
use of the same form. Even today, cash consideration is only begin
ning to be mentioned in the merger clauses of standard anti-dilution
provisions.

111

Another well-known convertible bond case,

korian,

1 12

H arjj v . Ker

also shows the potential for extensive judicial interven

tion . There a group of convertible bondholders unsuccessfully chal
lenged 1 1 3 a large cash dividend as a breach of fiduciary duty. The
case might better have been characterized as one of contract inter
pretation. The governing contract, unlike the standard contract be
ing drafted today, 1 1 4 contained no explicit provision covering cash
dividends. Thus viewe d ,

Har.ff is a garden variety "omitted term"

case in which interpretation shows only that the parties failed to
provide any contract term relevant to their dispute. 1 1 5 On this anal-

111.
The modifications reinforce the Broad II result by adding cash as a type of
"other property." Approximately half of the indentures surveyed in connection with the prep
aration of this Article, see supra note 75, included a modified version of the language at issue in
Broad. The most popular technique is addition of the phrase "or cash" after the phrase "other
property."
324 A.2d 215 ( Del. Ch. 1974) , rev'd, 347 A .2d 133 ( Del. 1 97 5 ) .
1 12.
The Chancery granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that no fiduciary
1 13.
duty obtained, and that the bondholders in any event assu med the risk of an issuer dividend
policy designed to destroy conversion value. 324 A.2d at 219, 222. The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed , looking again at the complaint and construing it to allege "fraud. " Both
courts agreed that a "fraudulent" dividend was actionable by the bondholders. Unfortu
nately, neither attempted precisely to explain the concept of fraud intended. Since the possi
ble meanings of "fraud" in the Harff context range from a traditional misrepresentation,
through fraud on creditors, to a constructive fraud close in nature to the breach of a corporate
duty of loyalty, the Harff opinions remain difficult to decipher.
1 14 .
Of the 46 indentures surveyed for this Article, see supra note 75, 35 permit cash
dividends out of surplus without adjustment, while 1 1 permit all cash dividends without ad
justment. Forty-four of the 46 provide pro rata adjustments for spin-otis and other distribu
tions in kind.
The relevant provisions of the Model I ndenture are §§ 1 3-6 ( B ) ( 3 ) , Alternate 1 and 1 36( C ) , Alternate 1 . A B F CoMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 546, 547. See also Model Simplified
Indenture, supra note 69, at 766-67 ( Sample Provision 1 0 . 0 8 ) .
1 15.
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) O F CONTRACTS § 2 0 4 ( 1981 ) provides: " When t h e par
ties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a term
which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in
the circumstances is supplied by the court. " For discussion of this provision, &..OB Speidel, Re
statement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method , 67 CORNELL L. REv. 785 ( 1982 ) .

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

696

ysis, no doctrinal barrier prevented the

Harff court from filling the

gap with a term protecting the bondholders.
The courts' normally safe assumption that standard b ond con
tract provisions reflect exact allocations of risk proved to be unsafe
in both

Broad II and Harff. Much of the j ustification for interpreta

tion based on standard usage readings and internal structural analy
sis disappears along with that assumption.
As the inquiry in such cases is opened to encompass circum
stances from outside the four corners of the document, it becomes
more difficult to justify any one meaning as "plainly" advancing the
parties9 expectations. 1 1 6 Consider the evidence presented above re
garding the meaning of the language at issue in Broad II. It permits
conflicting inferences to be drawn, 1 1 7 so that it cannot be said that
one meaning more probably protects expectations. To resolve such a
case, the court must intervene on the basis of external, substantive
considerations, either ethical or economic. 1 1 8

1 16 .

Of course, if inquiry into the circumstances produces evidence that a given

meaning in fact is attached by the parties, that meaning should prevail. For consideration of
the

case

where the bondholders attach one meaning and the issuer a different meaning,

Se€

Bratton, supra note 93, at 376-77.
1 1 7.

Cf. Broenen v. Beaunit Corp., 440 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1 97 0 ) , which concerned

the same anti-dilution provisions as Broad. The

case

involved a triangular merger. Literally

applied, the standard form merger language was adverse to the holders' tax interests.

!d. at

1 245-46.
Here, as in Broad, the standard language applies without apparent ambiguity or vague
ness when construed within the four corners of the document. But here consideration of the
entire circumstances reinforces the conclusion in favor of the issuer. These bondholders, unlike

those in Broad, retained an unimpaired equity participation in the combined entity. More
over, the tax risks at issue customarily are allocated by means of explicit representations,
opinions of counsel a;1d other similar devices. The standard public convertible bond transac
tion lacks these tax trappings. And since

so

many standard and mass produced tax transac

tions exist, even uninformed L·westors would be unlikely to form expectations of issuer respon
sibility ior tax results concerning the bonds.
If the contract itself did not provide an answer in this case and the question were open
to judicial intervention, bondholder protection might make a great deal oi sense. This
merger's structure entirely serves the parent's interests; triangular mergers result in signifi
cant cost savings, here obtained at the expense of an adverse tax result for the bondholders.
For another case distinguishable from Broad as a matter of interpretation,

Se€

Prescott, Ball &

Turben v. LTV Corp., 531 F. Supp. 213 ( S .D .N.Y. 1 98 1 ) .
This is not to say that extrinsic evidence o f the history of the standard form o r the

market's understanding of the language in question always is persuasive. For an instance in
which an interpretation within the four corners of the document properly
weigh an interpretation with outside backing,

Se€

vras

held to out

Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d

932, 939-40 ( Del. 1979 ) . See also Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 630 ( Del. 1 97 7 )
( preferred stock o f Shanghai Power
1 18.

&

Ligh t ) , for effective use o f extrinsic evidence.

This is the process traditionally called "construction." The Broad

ogllized its necessity, at least su.b silentio. The "plain meaning" veneer in

II court rec
Broad II masked the

substantive judgment that the holders "got what they paid for." And the court followed its
interpretive ruling with an unnecessary defense of the ruling's factual fairness.

642

F.2d at
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Some recent interpretation cases dealing with the residual risks
of dilution and destruction reached this level of substantive discus
sion only to make pointed citations to

Parkinson v. West End Street

Railway1 1 9 and reaffirm allocation of the drafting burden to the
bondholder. The cases took this approach even while paying all due
obeisance to the notion that good faith duties apply to all promis
ors. 1 2 0 Their analysis centered upon both the expectations of con
vertible bondholders and issuers and the needs of the bond mar
ket. 1 2 1 As to expectations, the courts reasoned that bondholders
make a "knowledgeable gamble" from an equal bargaining posi
tion 1 2 2 and bear only the risks they pay to bear. As for the market,
certain and consistent constructions are essential to its smooth oper
ation. Staying with the classical approach preserves these expecta
tions and keeps bond contracts out of the hands of unpredictable
juries. 1 2 3
This continued classicism regarding convertibles accords with
the courts' traditional treatment of all debt securities, providing no
rights other than those expressed in the contract. 1 2 4 From a broader
perspective, one perceives a judicial tendency to leave the classical
allocation of the drafting burden in place in contract contexts in-

956-57. Other gratuitous discussions of the equities appear in Wood v. Coastal States Gas
Corp . , 401 A.2d 932, 942 ( D el. 1 979) ( dilution of convertible preferred stock by spin-off) ; and
B .S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'i Bank, 42 Del. Ch. 106, 204 A.2d 746 ( Sup. Ct. 1%4 ) ( dilution
of convertible bond by sale of substantially all assets) .
1 1 9.

173 Mass. 446, 53 N . E . 891 ( 1 899 ) . See supra note 57 and accompa,.'l.ying text.

120.

Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 951-52

Cir. 1982) (Adams, J . , dissentin g ) , cert. denied,

_

( 3d

U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475 ( 1983 ) ; Broad v.

Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957-58 ( 5th Cir . ) ( en bane ) , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
( 1981 ) ; Kessler v. General Cable Corp., 92 Cal. App. 3d 531, 544, 1 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 103
( 1 979 ) . The Restatement Second's good faith provision applies to "every contract. " RESTA TE

MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 ( 1981 ) .
121 .

The Broad II court accomplished this b y using a plain meaning approach which

effectively prevented a finding of ambiguity, and thus, a good faith issue from a..risi ng. 642
F.2d at 940-57. See also Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 951
(3d Cir. 1982) (Adams, J., dissenting ) , cert. denied,

_

U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475 ( 1983 ) ; Levine

v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 60 A.D .2d 246, 249-50, 400 N.Y.S.2d 76, 79 ( 1977 ) .
122.

See, e.g . , Kessler v . General Cable Corp., 9 2 Cal. App. 3 d 531, 544, 155 Cal.

Rptr. 94, 1 03 ( 1 979 ) .
123.

T his is the Broad II view, 642 F.2d a t 947-48 n.20.

A related doctrine calls for "strict" application of the bond contract's procedural provi
sions. See, e.g., Timpone v. Concord Enters., 93 Misc. 2d 691, 693, 403 N .Y.S.2d 457, 459
(Sup. Ct. 1978) ( strict adherence to time limitations on the face of bond ) .
124.

I n the convertibie bond context,

see

Harff v . Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 2 1 5 ( Del. Ch.

1974 ) , rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 1 97 5 ) . For a case concerning straight bonds, see Wolfensoh11 v.
Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72 ( Del. 1969) (no good faith duty to extend participation in
new investments to holders of income bonds 2Jter holding company reorganization ) .
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volving large amounts of money and parties sophisticated in busi
ness and finance. 1 2 5
A small but growing body of case law reverses the classical pre
sumption, invoking good faith notions to place the drafting burden
on the convertible bond issuer where its actions benefit the stock
holders by diminishing the value of the conversion privilege. T his is
done without a great deal of explication. At best, the courts tell us
that the good faith duty protects the parties' expectations in the
fruits of the contract, and the issuer action in question deprives the
bondholders of those fruits. 1 2 6
All of these opinions rest on judicial intuitions concerning fair
ness and efficiency. These in turn rest on fragmentary pictures of the
relationship created by the convertible bond contract . Indeed , the
emergence of conflicting judicial approaches hardly comes as a sur
prise. The relationship is complex enough to yield substantial j ustifi
cations for both approaches. A more coherent judicial allocation of
risks requires a more thorough understanding of the entire circum
stances of the contractual relation. The following subpart provides
this.

B. A New Look at Judicial A llocation of the Risks of Convertible
Bondholding
As previously discussed , neoclassical interpretation under the
good faith rubric permits, but does not compel, creation of a com
mon law of bondholder protection for cases where the b ond contract

1 25.

See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in

International Trade, 63 COLUM. L . REv. 1413, 1 4 1 6- 1 7 ( 1963 ) ; Farnsworth, Omissions, supra

note 62, at 884-86.
126.
See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp. , 6 1 4 F.2d 4 1 8 , 430 ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) , vacated,
642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir. ) , cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) ; Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d
812, 8 1 5 (2d Cir. 1977 ) , a.ff'd, 444 U.S. 472, ( 1980 ) ; Van Gernert v. Boeing Co. , 520 F.2d 1 373,
1383, 1 385 ( 2d Cir. ) , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 ( 1975 ) . I n two similar cases j udges called for
close scrutiny when issuers act to prejudice the interests of subordinated security holders. See
Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 ( Del. 1 977 ) , citing Zahn v. Transamerica
Corp ., 162 F.2d 36 ( 3d Cir. 1947 ) .
This good faith strain has shown u p clearly only i n the last decade o r so. Even so, a few
older cases incline toward placement of the drafting burden on the issuer. See, e.g., Merritt,
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. New York Trust Co., 1 84 F.2d 954 ( 2d Cir. 1 9 5 0 ) ; Mueller v.
Howard Aircraft Corp. , 329 I ll. App. 203, 7 0 N .E.2d 203 ( 1946 ) . (Since Merritt was decided,
the financial community has developed unambiguous standard terms covering stock divi
dends, see A B F COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 546 ( Sample Provision § 1 3-6( B ) ( 3 ) , Alter
nate 1 ) , and has made it clear that anti-dilution protection protects the underlying shares'
economic value and does not insure a percentage of the total number of underlying shares. )
See also Stephenson v. Plastics Corp. of America, 276 Minn. 400, 1 5 0 N . W . 2 d 668
( 1 967 ) (spin-off ) . Cf. Carey v. Rothman, 55 Wis. 2d 732, 200 N.W. Zd 591 ( 1 972) ( employee
stock option; creation of holding company) .
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fails clearly to allocate all risks. This subpart takes up the resulting
question of whether such j udicial intervention is morally and eco
nomically justified in the circumstances of the convertible bond rela
tionship . To this end, it draws a detailed picture of the expectations
of the disparate group of investors in convertible bonds, focusing on
their informational sophistication respecting residual risks of dilu
tion and destruction and its relationship to the market p ricing of
bonds. The effects of j udicial intervention on the costs of drafting
bond contracts, as well as the costs of pricing and trading bonds are
considered . This subpart concludes that Parkinson 1 2 7 now safely
can be overruled and the drafting burden placed on the issuer, at
least in cases where the bondholder can be afforded relief through
adjustment of the conversion price or transfer of the conversion
privilege to the common stock of a successor issuer . 1 2 8
1 . BONDHOLDER EXPECTATIONS AND BONDHOLDER INFORMATION
LEVELS

Some legal commentators characterize the bond investor as one
who makes investment decisions based on six or seven standard fea
tures conveniently su.mmarized by a financial service like Moody's
Bond Survey, without scrutinizing other matters pertaining to the
bond contract. 1 2 9 Such an investor makes decisions in ignorance or
conscious disregard of the existence of the residual risks of dilution
and destruction. Even an investor who checks the prospectus 1 3 0 of

note

127.
Parkinson v . West End St. Ry . , 173 Mass . 446, 53 N . E . 891 ( 1899 ) . See supra
57 and accompanying text.
1 28.
Thus, the presumption would not give the bondholders a right to block a liqui

dation which is to be followed by a dissolution. Short of forcing the issuer to stay in business or
awarding speculative damages based on the deprivation of "upside" participation in future
equity, complete relief is afforded in a dissolution by the standard anti�dilution provision's pro
rata right to convert into whatever the stockholders receive in the dissolution proceedings.

I t should be noted that only a rule of construction is proposed. To the extent that the

bond contract expressly and clearly puts all or part of the risk of dilution or destruction on the
bondholders, the presumption does not operate.
The question

whether the courts ever justifiably might override an explicit allocation of

risk to the bondholders in the context of a publicly traded bond is treated infra notes 186-259
and accompanying text.

1 29.

See Liewellyn, supra note 7 1 , at 721; cj. Chirelstein, To1JJards

a

Federal Pidu.ci�

ary Starulards Act, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 203, 218 ( 1 98 1 ) ( investors in stocks optrate on gro.:s
assumptions regarding management conduct ) .

130.

Mandatory disclosure of the existence of the residual risks at least might ame

liorate this investor ignorance. Yet neither the �uri ties Exchange Commission nor the New

York Stock Exchange requires such disclosure. The survey of pro.'ipectuses respecting con-

vertibles newly issued between October 1, 1981 and September 30, 1982 done in conne-.::t ion
with the preparation of this Article show-s that

8.

uniform practice prevails. The anti-dilution

proviSions are accurately, but literally, summarized in the main body of the ptospe·:: t us. Their
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an issue, will find no warnings of residual risks and will indeed be
surprised when a merger impairs conversion value six months later.
This investor ignorance of the residual risks implies investor expec
tations that the conversion privilege purchased with the bonds will
survive for their full term.
Services and handbooks directed to prospective convertible
bond investors support this picture of investor expectation . They
caution the investor to check the call provisions and to check that
the bond contract contains standard anti-dilution provisions, but
they do not warn the investor of the shortcomings shared by all
standard provisions.

131

The financial economic literature also fits this picture. I n con
cocting theoretical valuation models for convertibles, financial econ
omists tend either to ignore residual risks of dilution and destruction
entirely or, while recognizing their relevance, nonetheless find them

unsuited to their models. 1

32

import with respect to risk allocation, however, is not discussed. As a result, the prospectus,
taken alone, dispels no misconceptions concerning the scope of anti-dilution protection.
For criticism oi the descriptions of anti-dilution provisions contained in prospectuses,
see Kaplan,

supra note 7, at 27 & n.37; 12 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES 1 05 ( Sept. 2 1 , 1981 ) .

The N ew York Stock Exchange's listing requirements, although requiring that notice of
expiration of conversion rights prior to maturity be placed on the bon d , New York Stock
Exchange Company Manual § A 1 2 ( I ) , do not require notice of possibilities of dilution and
destruction.

131.

Graham, Dodd and Cottle's ciass i c text for analysts recommends a check to

make sure anti-dilution provisions are included in the trust indenture. The text goes no farther
than that in detailing risks of dilution and destruction. See B. GRAHA1.1, D. DODD & S . COTTLE,
supra note 7, at 6 1 5 . T. NODDINGS, THE Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO CONVERTIBLE SECURI

TIES 10 ( 1 97 3 ) , goes a few steps further.

Value Line Convertibles, which describes itself as the o.ll-in-one service for convertibles
and warrants, pubiishes bi-weekly a table describing all publicly traded convertible bonds.

One item covered is anti-dilution protection. Most issues are designated as havi.ng "full pro

tection." But "full protection" means only that the bonds are subject to anti-dilution provi
sions fully adjusting for stock splits and stock dividends.

See 3 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE

SURV. 203, 204 ( June 19, 1972 ) .
Finally,

Moody's Bond Survey analyzes new issues as they appear, without noting
See, e.g., 73 MOODY's BOND SURV. 603, 646, 699, 760, 761, 763,

residual anti-dilution risks.

769, 805, 826 ( 1 981 ) .
1 32.
See Jennings, supra note 23 , a t 3 4 , and Wei!, Segall & Green, supra note 23, at
446, 448, for studies which recognize the risk but leave it out of the model.
The more recent "contingent claims" valuation studies, see supra note 28, ignore the
risks entirely. See, e.g., Brennan & Schwartz, Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 2 1 , at 9 1 3- 14,
924-25.
Of course, theoretical valuation models are based on perfect markets assumptions

See, e.g., Ingersoll, Contingent Claims, supra note 23, at
292-93. The models nevertheless are relevant evidence. Despite their theoretical character
which do not obtain in the real worl d .

economists devise them with an eye towards real world usefulness. Cj. Brennan & Schwartz,

Analyzing Convertibles, supra note 2 1 , at S07--08 ( extending theory to cover more complex real
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The picture's accuracy i s further supported by t h e results of an
elaborate empirical study of the variables affecting convertible bond
premiums. The study suggests that convertible bond prices are in
sensitive to variations in the degree of anti-dilution protection. 1 3 3
Other more casual observers make the same point. 1 3 4 Similarly,
market professionals-underwriters, brokers and traders respond
ing to a questionnaire distributed in connection with another
study-reported that a substantial number of investors buy con
vertibles without understanding even their fundamental investment
characteristics. 1 3 5
Not all investors lack knowledge of the existence of residual
risks, however. The investor who regularly reads a special converti
ble bond reporting service like

Value Line should be well aware of

the limited protection afforded by standard bond contract provi
sions.

Value Line provides reports on diluent and destructive issuer

actions such as calls, stock dividends, recapitalizations and cash out
mergers, and occasionally runs pieces explaining anti-dilution provi
sions in detaii thus warning investors of their limitations. 1 3 6 The
existence of

Value Line and its $300 plus annual subscription price

fairly imply the existence of a class of well-informed investors in
convertibles.
This does not imply that such a class makes all bond investment
decisions with complete knowledge, however. Even a sophisticated
investor rationally might determine that the costs of ascertaining
and e valuat in g the residual risks exceed the benefits accruing in the
form of a more accurate valuation.
Moreover, even if an investor does know that residual risks

ex

ist , it does not automatically follow that the investor's expectations
perfectly accord with actual rights under the bond contract. The in
vestment community becomes aware of some latent residual risks
only as events point to th eir existence.

Value Line, for example, had

to modify and expand its coverage of the residual risks to account

world conditions ) ; Ingersoll, Corporate Call Poltcies, supra note 35 (modifying model to :::over
observed suboptimal call policies ) .
1 33.

Jennings, supTa note 23, at 34.

1 34 .

See

Kaplan, supra note 7 , a t 27--28. Kaplan, upon inquiry made to market pro

fessionals, found that the market made no apparent pricing distinctions between issues with
conversion price-based and market price-based anti-dilution clauses.
135.

M. TENNICAN, CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURE..<; AND RELATED SECURITIES 33

( 1 975 ) . Berle and Means, reierring to warrants, observed the market 's shortcomings five de
cades ago. A . BERLE
1 36.

See

& S.

MEANS, s·upm note 5 1 , at 20 1 .

1 2 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLES 1 0 5 ( Sept. 2 1 , 1981 ) ; 3 VALUE LINE CON

VERTIBLE SURV. 201 ( June 19, 1972 ) ; 1 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE BOND SERV. , 1 ( Dec. 9,
1968 ) .
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for new developments respecting mergers. I ts commentary on dilu
tion problems around 197 0 either ignored mergers or noted the p os
sibility that a merger might adversely affect the conversion pre
mium. 1 3 7 In the mid- 1 97 0 's, however, a number of cash out mergers
occurred which destroyed the value of outstanding warrants and
thereby demonstrated the vulnerability of convertibles. Value Line
and other commentators 1 3 8 asserted that the allocation of the risk of
cash out mergers to the holders was unj ustified. I t demanded that
"investor confidence be restored" and "the . . . stock exchanges
. . . take the initiative and make full protection a condition for list
ing . " 1 3 9 The stock exchanges and the drafters of new trust inden
tures never met these demands, however, and by 1 980 Value Line
was content to note only the existence of the merger risk and to rec
ommend that bondholders pay close attention to pendin g takeovers
and mergers. 1 4 0
The foregoing evidence permits a rough differentiation of b ond
holders into groups according to their levels of informational sophis
tication. The best informed investors go into the first grou p . These
investors, although not necessarily conscious of all remote diluent
and destructive contingencies, at least know that the class of risks
exists. For purposes of contractual fairness analysis, these b ond
holders' expectations are qualified by knowledge of the residual
risks.
Occupying a middle level are investors well-informed enough to
know of the more obvious risks placed on the holder by the bond
contract, such as call and subordination to other indebtedness.
These holders incur some costs in monitoring for bond contract
risks, but they are unaware of the residual risks. To the extent that
they are at all aware of the p ossibility of dilution and destruction,
they assume that the issuers bear the risk.
At the b ottom are investors in over their heads. These investors
are entirely unaware of standard bond contract provisions, such as
call rights, which make investment in the conversion p rivilege an
especially risky venture. These investors also are unaware of the
special need for monitoring investments in convertibles.

1 37.

See VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE BOND SERV. 1 , 3 ( Dec. 9, 1 968) ; 2 VALUE LINE

CONVERTIBLE SURV. 289 ( Mar. 22, 1 97 1 ) .

138.
See T . NODDINGS, supra note 1 3 1 , a t 168-80; N .Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1974, § 3 , at
13, col. 1. Both suggested SEC action.
139. 5 VALUE LINE CoNVERTIBLE SURV. 265, 268 ( Apr. 15, 1974). See also 3 id. at 381
(Jan. 1, 197 3 ) .
1 40.
1 1 VALUE LINE OniONS & CONVERTIBLES 105, 1 08 ( Sept. 15, 1980 ) .
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The corporate lawyers who draft convertible bond contracts
and , presumably, the underwriters and issuers they represent, also
can be differentiated according to their respective levels of informa
tional sophistication. Information concerning residual risks is read
ily available to anyone in the corporate bar or the financial commu
nity prepared to listen. Yet the bar and the financial community
continue to use a standard form that fails to allocate these risks.
The "good faith" clauses discussed above 1 4 1 could remedy the
residual risk problem by p lacing such risks on the issuer. But such
clauses did not appear in any of the trust indentures surveyed for
this Article. A minority of counsel did modify the standard form,
but did so to p lace all residual risks clearly on the bondholders.
Twenty-five per cent of the indentures surveyed p rovide that no
anti-dilution adjustments may b e made except as explicitly required
by the anti-dilution provisions. 1 4 2 Given the straightforward draft
ing choice that residual risks thus present, it must be inferred that
most trust indentures either are mindlessly marked up by drafters
unaware of the form's limitations or are marked up by drafters who
see the problem but leave the risk unallocated .
While these different pictures do not provide a complete work
ing model of bondholder expectations, they do suffice to show the
inaccuracy of the model used by the courts in which every investor
on the bond market clearly grasps and foresees the residual risks,
applies the classical risk allocation approach , and values the bond
accordingly. The justification that "they got what they paid for"
must be questioned, at least in part, because "they" are a disparate
group . Although all investors have access to information concerning

the residual risks, different individual investors in fact possess differ
ent amounts of information. B ondholders accordingly lack a unitary
set of expectations.

These pictures also begin to j ustify invocation of good faith
principles to protect bondholders from the residual risks. Allocating
the residual risks to the bondholders tends to frustrate their expec

tations, in every case where the bondholder is unaware that the
residual risks exist, and , where the residual risk is latent, in the case
of a well-informed bondholder as well. Where the bondholder is un·�
informed, dilig en ce in gathering available information could have

See supra note 9 2 and accompanying text.
141.
See, e.g., Trust Indenture, betwe€n National Medical Enterprises, Inc. and
142.
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Truste€, § 1 0 . 1 2 ( Nov. 30, 198 1 ) ( on file with
author) . It is noted that good faith clauses tend to be included in contracts coverii1g privately
placed convertible securities. See Debevoise, Plimpton, I nvestments in Convertibles, supi a
note 79, at 1 7 .
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prevented the b ondholder's expectations from exceeding bon d con
tract protections. Yet, this apparent fault can be balanced against
the issuer's own lack of diligence. B ondholder expectations persist
ently outpace contract protections and are frustrated by remote
risks. We can ascribe to the issuer knowledge of this, since it has a
direct role in the drafting process. The issuer thus can be faulted for
failing to correct these mistaken expectations with a bond contract
that is crystal clear . 1 4 3 It is not immediately apparent which party,
the uninformed holder or the lackadaisical issuer, is more at fault,
and further inquiry does not promise a clear answer.
Once fault is put aside we can focus on frustrated b on dholder
expectations. I f we accept the above evidence that convertible bond
prices are insensitive to residual risks, it turns out that the b ond
holders have not been compensated by lower bond prices for bearing
the residual risks. T hus, protecting b ondholders against the residual
risks could be justified on the grounds that they are entitled to the
benefit of their bargain.
2. EFFICIENT BOND MARKETS
The above case for bondholder protection is based on an incom
plete picture of convertible bond pricing. A very different picture
obtains under the theory of efficient capital markets, particularly on
the question of compensation for bearing residual risks. 1 44 An " effi
cient" market price fully reflects all available information . The se
curities markets are efficient because free competition results in the
generation, dissemination and digestion of information about the se
curities traded on them. 1 4 5
Since the b ond market is efficient, the theory tells us t hat b ond
prices reflect full information of residual risks. In an efficient market,
the best-informed traders scan bond contracts for shortcomings in
the protection of the conversion privilege. Then, making the gener
ally accepted 1 4 6 economic assumption of symmetric market ration-

143.

See Bratton, supra note 93, at 374-77, discussing reason to know and fault

ascription in bond contract interpretation.
144.

See, e . g . , Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 964 n.l ( 5t h Cir. ) ( Hen

derson, J . , concurring in part and dissenting in part ) , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) .

145.
See, e.g., E. FAMA & M . MILLER, THE THEORY O F FINANCE 335-36 ( 1 972 ) ; R .
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O F LAW 3 1 5-21, 324-26 ( 2d e d . 1977 ) . For a cogent summary ,
see Easterbrook

&

Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a

Tender O.ffH , 94 HA..'\V. L. REV. 1 1 6 1 , 1 1 65-66 & nn. 14, 15 ( 1981 ) . The competitive process

keeps price and value in line because arbitragers rush in to bid up or down the price of the
security whenever new information material to its value reaches the market. I d.
H6.

Smith & Warner, supra note 3, at 1 1 9.
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ality, 1 4 7 they project the likelihood of future diluent issuer actions
and discount the value of the bonds accordingly. They further scan
for provisions requiring issuer notice of actions affecting the value of
the conversion privilege, project the monitoring costs necessary to
overcome any shortcomings in them, and discount the bond price to
compensate for these costs . 1 4 8 All these activities cause prices to re
flect the residual risks fully and compensate all bondholders for
bearing such risks, whether or not the risks figured into their indi
vidual expectations. Arguably, then, judicial protection of contrary
bondholder expectations is unjustified, and allocation to the bond
holders of the burden of drafting against the residual risks is consist
ent with good faith.
This efficient markets model is too simplistic, however. It must
be modified to account for all the valuation variables which arise out
of the real world body of information concerning the risks of holding
convertibles. 1 4 9 For example, the model's assumption that the best
informed investor will assume symmetric market rationality may
not be sound. We have already seen that the laxity of issuers in exer
cising call rights implies a largess toward bondholders at odds with
symmetric market rationality. 1 5 0 Similar largess has been shown in
cash out mergers. Some acquiring corporations have offered settle
ments to warrantholders, even though their investments otherwise
would have been rendered valueless because the warrant's exercise
price exceeded the cash price per share under the merger. 1 5 1 Other
acquiring corporations have offered partial compensation and still
others no compensation at al1 . 1 5 2 A model based on symmetric mar
ket rationality would be inaccurate to the extent that "irrational "

For discussions of symmetric market rationality and security pricing, see Smith
3, at 1 1 8-19, and Anderson, supra note 1 , at 750-5 1 .
1 48.
The role of monitoring costs in security pricing is discussed in Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 3, at 338.
1 49.
Empirical evidence both supports and contradicts efficient markets theory. See,
e.g., E . FAMA & M. MILLER, supra note 1 4 5 , at 336. Barry, The Economics of Outside Informa
tion and Rule l Ob-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 307, 1 330-54 ( 1 98 1 ) , reviews the theoretical and
empirical literature on the efficient capital markets hypothesis. Barry conciudes: "[A]lthough
the market appears reasonably efficient at reflecting historical price information in current
prices, the evidence suggests that it is less efficient with respect to current developments and
noticeably inefficient with respect to non-public information." Id. at 1348.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-48.
150.
3 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE SURV. 381 ( Jan. 1 , 1973 ) ; 3 VALUE LINE CONVERT
151.
IBLE SURV. 1 30, 1 32 ( Aug. 28, 1972 ) . Value Line attributes this to issuer recognition of the
equities of the holders' case.
152.
4 VALUE LINE CONVERTIBLE SuRv. 89, 92 ( Oct. 1 . 1 973 ) ; 3 VALUE LINE CoN
VERTIBLE SU RV . 381 ( Jan. 1, 1973 ) .
1 47 .

& Warner, supra note
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motives, such a s t h e sense of fair play, l e d acquiring corporations t o
take less than full advantage o f the bondholders.
Whatever the acquiring corporations' motivations, the very
possibility of more than one outcome results in yet another valua
tion variable for the efficient market's pricing mechanism. The best
informed investor in convertibles would have taken this range of
possibilities into account in assessing the destructive p otential of the
residual risks. Since this modification decreases the expected magni
tude of the residual risks, recognition of it theoretically should result
in a higher b ond price.
This modified picture is still one in which the market discounts
the bond price in recognition of the issuer's right to take diluent ac
tions, thereby compensating the bondholder for bearing the residual
risks. That the market also offsets the discount with the p ossibility
that the issuer voluntarily might not enforce these rights neither ne
gates the existence of these rights nor alters the logic of imposing the
risk of their exercise on the bondholders, because the efficient market
compensates them for bearing such risk.
B ut this analysis is affected if the model is further modified to
account for uncertainty in the outcome of j udicial interpretation of
contract terms. Contemporary courts differ in their approaches to
allocating the residual risks. 1 5 3 H owever remote the resulting set of
contingent outcomes may be for a particular bond, they create yet
another real world pricing variable for the best-informed investor.
Since dilution and destruction continue to be possible outcomes
under this variable, the efficient market price still compensates the
bondholders for bearing the risk. N evertheless, the fairness picture
changes because the variable also includes the risk that a court will
allocate residual risks to the issuer. The bond price reflects both pos
sibilities. If occasional judicial allocation of the risk to the issuer
cannot be found unfair, the efficient markets model thus leads to a
"fairness neutral" result.
Substantial objections can be raised against using even this
modified efficient markets model as a device for resolving this fair
ness question. If the bondholder "expectations" to be protected are
neoclassically conceived as the total set of reasonably held individ
ual understandings regarding rights under the bond contract, and
the total set of individual valuations based on such understandings,
then the efficient markets model fails to consider all relevant factors.
By looking solely to the price level set by the best-informed investor,

the model ignores possible differences in the subjective risk prefer-

153.

See supra notes 12-17, 1 1 9-26 and accompanying text.
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ences o f individual investors. If t h e less informed investors were
more risk averse, they would pay less for the security if made aware
of the residual risks. As to them, therefore, the model's market price
would be too high. Even under efficient markets theory, therefore,
they cannot be said to have " gotten what they paid for . " 1 5 4
A similar point can be made regarding the monitoring costs of
investors having bond portfolios of different sizes. Incurring the
$300 per year cost of a

Value Line subscription plus the cost of the

time spent reading the service each week would be rational for an
investor with a $ 1 0 , 00 0 , 000 convertible bond portfolio, but would
not be rational for an investor owning one convertible bond with a
$ 1 0 00 face value. Since the large investor efficiently can minimize
the residual risks through monitoring and diversification, the same
$ 1 00 0 face value bond will be worth more to it than to the small
investor e v e n t h o u g h b o t h invest o r s h a v e i d e n t i fical r i s k
preferences.
Finally, it must be noted that the model elaborated above is
based on the strong version of the efficient markets model. 1 5 5 Other,
weaker versions in the economic literature permit construction of a
pricing model falling somewhere in between the efficient markets
model and the touchstone picture discussed above with respect to
differing bondholder sophistication. 1 5 6 For example, Grossman and
Stiglitz recently formulated a model in which prices only partially
reflect the information level of the most sophisticated trader. The
price becomes more informative as the number of well-informed in
dividuals trading the security increases. The price is completely ac
curate only if all t raders have full information. 1 5 7

1 54 .
This risk-preference based criticism runs u p against the "capital asse t pricing
model. " According to this model, the prices of assets in the capital markets adjust until assets
with equivalent risks have the same expected rates of return. See generally Modigliani &
Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68 ( 1974 ) .
Commentators have noted that the model provides cold comfort t o an investor who, out of
ignorance, errs in assessing the riskiness of an investment. Cf. Jennings, supra note 23, at 52,
where an entire valuation model for convertible bonds is limited by the factor of investor risk
preference.
See Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1 604, 1 6 17
1 55.
( 1971 ).
See supra text accompanying notes 1 24-43.
1 56 .
S e e Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Mar
1 57.
kets, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 393, 393-95 ( 1980 ) . The strong version's assertion that the price
reflects the information level of the best informed trader is based on an assumption of competi
tive equilibrium. The Grossman and Stiglitz modification instead assumes an "equilibrium
degree of disequilibrium . "
The Grossman and StigEtz model has great intui tive appeal to anyone who resists the
strong efficient markets assertion that costs incurred in developing market information are
wasted. The model holds out the possibility that these expenditures will be rewarded.
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Under this model, convertible bond p rices do n ot reflect a l l of
the risks assumed by the bondholders unless all investors are fully
informed regarding such risks. T he less informed the investor group,
the higher its expectations and the higher the bond price. The more
distorted the price, the greater the disappointment of bondholder
exp ectations when the issuer takes diluent or destructive action.
The more palpable the denial of expectations, the stronger the case
for allocating the risk to the issuer.
Regardless of the accuracy or usefulness of the weaker efficient
markets model, it does permit one point to be made in the present
context. Given the suppositions of neoclassical contract law, strong
efficient markets theory is too blunt an instrument to be adopted as
a fairness guide respecting the relationship governed by a public
issue bond contract. Only a model sensitive to differing b ondholder
information levels will differentiate b ondholder expectations with
sufficient accuracy to resolve a controversy turning on conflicting
interests of bondholders and issuers.
3.

FAIRNESS IMPASSE

If actual bondholder expectations are aggregated and netted
out and the resulting average expectation taken as the relevant one,
then the traditional strict contract law approach can be defended as
an accurate reflection of compensated bondholder expectations,
even under the weaker efficient markets model. Since institutions
hold most convertible bonds,

1 58

it reasonably can be inferred that

most convertible b onds are held by well-informed investors. Analyz
ing this fact under the weaker efficient markets model, and assuming
that convertible bond prices are sensitive to allocations of the
residual risks, leads to the conclusion that prices largely take ac
count of residual risks and that the bondholders bear them .
The flaw in this defense of the traditional approach is the aver
age of bondholder expectations on which it is based. Under this view
the expectations of holders at lower information levels cannot be sin
gled out for protection. This conflicts with one of the good faith doc
trine's more attractive fairness precepts-that the reasonable expec
tations of all parties be protected to the greatest extent p ossible.
The expectations of the uninformed bondholders are viable can
didates for protection. Under a weak efficient markets model, the
uninformed holders will not be fully compensated ex ante for bearing
the residual risks. They likewise will not be compensated for the

158.

See Alexander & Stover, supra note 29, at 36.
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transfer of wealth to the stockholders which results from diluent or
destructive issuer action. And as already seen, they are not cogniza
bly at fault in expecting the conversion privilege to be unimpaired
by the residual risks. 1 5 9
But i f w e resolve interpretive questions concerning the residual
risks against the issuer, we create new problems. T his approach
would protect the expectations of the uninformed holders, but it
simultaneously would shift the residual risks away from the well
informed b ondholders who have been compensated for bearing
them. This approach thus would effect a wealth transfer from the
stockholders to the well-informed bondholders even while prevent
i n g a w e a l t h t r a n s f e r f ro m t h e u n in f o r m e d h o l d e r s to t h e
stockholders.
When the position of the issuer is taken into account the matter
becomes more complicated still. The issuer and its common stock
holders are compensated for the conversion privilege at the bonds'
initial issue when the underwriters pay the purchase money. If un
derwriters are at the highest information level, then it follows that
the price paid at original issue would come close to reflecting fully
the residual risks. As the bonds later were traded on the market,
however, institutions and individuals with less information would
buy into the bondholder group and the bond price would tend less
and less to reflect the residual risks. Any corresponding rise in the
bond price would redound not to the issuer's benefit, however, but to
the benefit of well-informed bondholders selling out to b ondholders
at lower information levels. 1 6 0 Thus, the existence of uncompen
sated risks for some bondholders does not imply that the excess price
such bondholders pay is received by the issuer.
Finally, present uncertainty as to the direction of the courts
further complicates the search for fairness. Resolution of this uncer
tainty, whether in favor of issuers or holders, will result in wealth
transfers. B ecause bond prices now reflect this uncertainty, a firm
rule in favor of issuers would transfer value--the amount reflecting
holders' hopes of a favorable ruling-to issuers. A firm rule the other
way would transfer value to bondholders. An efficient market would
account for the present majority rule favoring issu e rs and would
price bonds expecting judicial placement of the residual risks on the
holders. Thus the price rise in response to

1 59 .
160.

S e e supra note

a

bondholder protective

143 and accompanying text.

I n practice, the shortfall in compensation to the issuer would be larger still.

Convertibles, like other bonds, tend to be underpriced at original issue in or de r to promote

quick sale and reduce the underwriters' risk. See Alexander & Stover, supra note 29, at 37-39.
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rule would be greater than the price decline in response to a rule
favoring the issuer. Counterbalancing this is the historical tendency
for bondholder expectations of anti-dilution protection to outpace
the actual scope of the explicit protections in the standard contract
provisions, even in the informed segments of the market. In addi
tion, although the actual market response to new dilution problems
cannot be predicted with certainty, historically the marketplace has
responded to most of them by revising the standard form in the
bondholders' favor.
If the fair result in a case allocating risks among p arties to a
contract is the result that protects paid for expectations, then the
above goes to show that such a case concerning convertible bonds
does not admit a perfectly fair result. Since a single bond contract
governs the rights of different parties with different expectations,
that contract is ill-suited to application of principles keyed to pro
tect individual expectations. Selecting among the various possible
approaches, then, is a matter of selecting a fair and workable ap
proach falling somewhat short of the ideal result.

4.

a.

ALTERNATE R O U TES TO THE FAIREST RESULT

Individualized just'ice
Some of these prob lems would be ameliorated if a court could

tailor its relief to individual expectations, adjusting conversion price
only as to bondholders whose expectations require protection. Each
holder would receive what he or she paid for, and the issuer's expec
tations would receive maximum p rotection . Such an approach, how
ever, would reward ignorance and thereby lessen bondholder incen
tive to gather information and to monitor bond market events. 1 6 1
· In addition, individualized inquiry into expectations would involve
inordinate time and expense, given large numbers of bondholders
and the nebulous nature of inquiry into individual information
levels. A rough-cut classification, such as a division between institu
tions and individuals, could avoid many of these costs, but at the
expense of accurate results. The clients of the incompetent institu
tion would be penalized while t he sharp individual would be
rewarded .

161.
This point is developed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Kronman, Mistake, Disclo
suTe, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 ( 1978 ) ; Levmon:, Securities and
Se�rets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracis, 68 VA. L. REV. 1 1 7 ( 1982 ) .
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D iffering treatment of holders of the same bonds, whether indi
vidually or by category, itself creates fairness problems. Just as dep
rivation of paid for expectations is thought unfair under one line of
contemporary values, so differing treatment of parties having the
same status under a single contract is thought unfair under another
line of contemporary values. 1 6 2 All other things being equal, per
haps the benefits flowing from an individualized approach would
surmount this "equal protection" objection. But all other things are
not equal and weigh against an individualized approach.

b. Protection of the status quo
Another way out of this fairness impasse might be to ignore al
location of the drafting burden and to focus instead on the values at
stake at the time the diluent or destructive action is challenged. The
emphasis, accordingly, would shift from protection of expectations
to preservation of the status quo .
Under such an approach different results might be reached in
sjmilar-looking cases. Consider again the cash out merger question
raised in

Broad v . Rockwell International Corp. 1 6 3 The magnitude of

the harm that cash out mergers cause convertibles greatly varies
with the circumstances. At one extreme lies a case where, even at the
cash out merger price, the p er share conversion value substantially
exceeds the conversion price . Here the merger's effect of cutting off
further appreciation of conversion value does not seem especially
unfair. The bondholders have received some or all of the capital ap
preciation for which the issuer was compensated at original issue,
the cash out price in all probability includes a premium over the
underlying common's pre-merger market price, 1 6 4 and the bonds

RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 ( 2 ) and comment e ( 1981 ) .
1 62.
1 63.
See supra notes 1 01-05 and accompanying text.
1 64.
Mergers tend to benefit convertible bondholders of transferor corporations, giv
ing them little legitimate cause for complaint. A stock-for-stock merger, for example, will
enhance conversion values if synergistic or other gains increase the value of the combined
entity. And whatever the form of the consideration paid to the transferor's stockholders, the
debt value of its convertible bonds will increase if the acquiring corporation has a credit stand
ing superior to that of the original issuer. This certainly was the case in Broad. See Broad II,
642 F.2d at 935.
I ndeed, debt value may increase even if the acquiring corporation's credit standing is
not higher than the original issuer's. The increased debt capacity of the combined entities may
have a "coinsurance effect." The theory is that so long as the earnings streams of the two firms
are less than perfectly correlated, the risk of default is reduced and borrowing capacity is
increased. See Lewellen, A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FIN.
521 ( 1 971 ) . See also Galai & Masulis, The Option Pricing Model arui the Risk Factor of Stock, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 53 ( 1976 ) ; Higgins & Scali, Corporate Bankruptcy arui Conglomerate Mergers, 30

WISCONSIN LAW REVIE W

712

were prime candidates for forced conversion through call i n any
event. At the other extreme lies a case like

Broad, where the issuer

has performed p oorly and debt value is higher than conversion value
at the cash out merger price . 1 6 5 H ere any damage to the b ondhold
ers resulting from the freezing of conversion value is highly specula
tive. Of course, so long

as

some slight chance remains that conver

sion value will exceed bond value at some time prior to the bonds'
maturity, the conversion privilege has a value that the merger de
stroys. Such value will h av e been more theoretical t h an real,
however.
There exists a middle ground in which cash out mergers more
palpably damage convertible bondholders. Consider a bond issue a
year or so old and a cash out merger which freezes conversion value
at a figure just under the conversion price. H ere conversion value
reasonably might have been expected to rise above the conversion
price in due course . The merger thus deprives the bondholders of the
chance for equity capital appreciation for which the issuer was com
pensated at original issue. M oreover, as a glance at the Figure will
confirm, 1 6 6 freezing conversion value in this case will destroy a sub
stantial conversion premium.
With these three different cash out merger cases compare a case
involving a spin-off of fifty percent of an issuer's assets where the
anti-dilution p rovisions are silent on the matter of spin-offs. Here
the balance of values more clearly favors the bondholders. An ad
justment of the conversion price leaves the status quo in place ; the

d i visi on of value between the stockholders and bondholders remains
unchanged even while the issuer action goes forward . C onversely,
failing to protect the bondholders permits the stockholders to arro
gate the value of the conversion premium to themselves without any
justifying business necessity.
It must be questioned whether preservation of the status quo is
a

value of sufficient moment to sustain a jurisprudence thus ridden

with inconsistencies. Furthermore, this approach's unpredictable
aspect detracts from its fairness and makes it inefficient. Since the
outcome depends to a great extent on the valuation picture at the
time of the issuer's action, it gives the market little guidance as to
the outcome in the next case. If the marketplace takes expectations

J . FIN. 93 ( 1975 ) ; Kim & McConnell, Corporate Mergers and the Co-Insurance of Corporate
Debt, 32 J. FIN. 349 ( 1 977 ) ; Smith & Warner, supra note 3, at 129.

1 65.

It is noted that a bondholder desiring an equity participation in the combined

entity can sell the bond at the increased debt value and use the proceeds to buy common stock
of the acquiring corporation on the market.
1 66.
See supra text following note 21 .
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713
a valuation variab le,

then judicial certainty facilitates the market pricing process. An

ad
hoc j udicial approach increases the range of future p ossible values,

making valuation more expensive and bond investment riskier. As a
result, bonds become less valuable to risk averse investors. 1 6 7 Clear
judicial rules and predictable judicial results increase the likelihood
that both issuers and well-informed bondholders will appraise bond
packages accurately and have their expectations satisfied over time.

c. Reconstructed negotiation
The same

ad hoc aspect impairs the utility of yet another mode

of devising a result according with the parties' expectations where
the parties' actual expectations are unexpressed . This mode has the
judge insert the term that the parties would have negotiated had
they thought about the unprovided for contingency. 1 6 8
Applied t o the standard form bond contract, this reconstructed
negotiation amounts to judicial speculation as to the financial com
munity's response to the allocation of the risk at issue---speculation
likely to be more intuitive than informed . 1 6 9 Even a prediction
grounded in knowledge of the financial community's assumptions
and predilections would be very uncertain, given the erratic pattern
of marketplace behavior in this context. Consider recent modifica
tions of the standard form explicitly allocating residual risks. Spin
offs now receive full anti-dilution prot-ection, 1 7 0 while the opposite
result seems to be obtaining regarding cash out mergers. 1 7 1 Market
p lace responses such

as

these resist the formulation of a predictive

model.

d. Fault
Contemporary contract doctrine takes into account punish
ment for fault and recompense for injury,

as

well

as

the more tradi-

167.
See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1 039, 1 048
(2d Cir. 1 982) , cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 1253 ( 1983 ) .
1 68.
Williams describes this as the "non-logical" j udicial implication o f a term. See
Williams, Language and the Law (pt. IV), 61 LAW Q. REv. 384, 400-04 ( 1945 ) .
Cj. Farnsworth, Omissions, supra note 62, at 879.
1 69.
All but two of the 46 recent trust indentures surveyed in connection with prepa
170.
ration of this Article, see supra note 75, provided for conversion price adj ustments in case of
spin-offs.
171.

AppiOximately half of the trust indentures in this Article's survey contained

merger provisions redrafted explicitly to freeze conversion value to the cash consideration
paid in the merger, thus ratifying the Broad II result. See also Model Simplified Indenture,
supra note 69, at 755 ( Sample Provision 5.0 1 ) .
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tional contractual objective of protection of expectations. A survey
of the bond relationship for a party at fault ultimately p oints to the
drafter. Faulting the drafter or, to use the contract law maxim, con
struing against the drafter, 1 7 2 would seem not only to punish the
culprit but also to place the drafting burden on the party best p osi
tioned to remedy the matter in subsequent transactions.
Unfortunately, closer inspection shows that this fault analysis
neither persuasively isolates the equities of bond disputes n or con
tributes to bond market efficiency. The drafters at fault here are the
underwriters and their counsel, who remove themselves from the re
lationship immediately after its inception and are not parties to sub
sequent contract disputes. Of course, the issuer could be faulted as
against the holders as the only remaining party that might have in
fluenced the drafting. Whether the issuer's lawyer might, in the best
of all possible worlds, have dealt with a remote contingency two,
five, or ten years earlier, does not impress one as the most crucial
circumsta.nce in what amounts to a pie-splitting contest b etween a
group of public stockholders and a group of public bondholders,
however. Furthermore, as already noted, 1 7 3 the issuer's fault in
drafting an imperfect document is counterbalanced by the holders'
fault in failing to educate themselves about such imperfections.
Duties of care and sanctions for failure to meet them can be
j ustified as prods prompting greater perfection in planning business
arrangements. But the bond market does not seem to need such ju
dicial prodding, at least with respect to risk allocation in trust in
dentures. The large amounts of money at stake in the typical public
bond issue and the financial community's custom of retaining emi
nent counsel to draft bond contracts suggest that the standard form
will be duly modified whenever serious drafting flaws come to light,
irrespective of the mode of dispute resolution chosen by the courts.

e. Bondholder protection
The alternate approaches being unacceptable, the result is a
choice between a rule in the issuer's favor, which does not protect
the expectations of uninformed bondholders, and a rule in the hold
ers' favor which does.
Certainly, substantial reasons support the traditional rule
favoring the issuer. Not the least among them is the still p owerful
ethic of creditor self-protection. The main parties in interest, issuers

172.

173.

See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 ( 1982 ) .
See supra text accompanying n o t e 143.
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a n d institutions , a r e well ab l e to protect themselves, whether
through contract provisions or through portfolio diversification.
The small, unsophisticated investor occupies a somewhat incidental
p lace in the overall picture. Furthermore, imposing a rule favoring
the bondholders risks wealth transfers to all members of the bond
holder group, no matter how well informed, at the expense of a pub
lic stockholder group which might easily be comprised of a larger
proportion of less informed investors.
Even so, charity counsels selection of the bondholder protective
rule. "we have here a publicly sold security so complex that even the
financial theorists have failed to settle upon a common set of valua
tion variables. ·Coupled with this complexity is the persistent phe
n omenon of sudden material realignments in the relationshi p ,
springing from arcane contract p rovisions. Among the entire group
of interested parties, the uninformed bondholders are the least well
situated to accomplish self-protection against these risks. Thus, in
vestor protective impulses such as those behind the federal securities
laws come to bear, albeit with less than full force. Moreover, solici
tude for the weak motivates extant good faith doctrine. One modern
maxim of contract construction directs courts to protect the reason
able expectations of the average member of the public subj ect to the
contract, despite any advantages given to similarly situated, but
better informed contracting parties. 1 7 4 This principle encourages
protection of uninformed investors despite resulting windfalls to so
phisticated investors.
Beyond this balancing of the different virtues of the interested
parties lies a more conventional case for a bondholder protective ap
proach. It is based on the overall structure of the convertible bond
relationship, particularly its basic apportionment of value. As al
ready indicated, the convertible bond creates bondholder claims
against the issuer's equity in consideration of a lower interest rate.
Unremedied diluent and destructive actions permit the issuer to re
capture a potentially substantial part of the equity claim without
refunding any portion of the bondholders' consideration. Nothing in
the standard bond contract sanctions so fundamental a realignment.
The flexibility the issuer supposedly seeks by including anti-dilution
provisions certainly does not do so. So long as judicial bondhol der
protection only affords relief through adjustment of the conversion

1 74.

See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 comment e ( 1 981 ) . See also

Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Varian.ce with Policy Provisiot>.,s, ( pt . I ) , 8:3 HARV. L. REV,
96 1 , 967 ( 1 970 ) , recommending,

as

a corollary to the principle of resolving ambiguity against

the drafter, t hat insurance policies be construed as laymen would construe them and not ac
cording to the in terpretation of sophisticated underwriters.
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price or transfer of the conversion privilege, no inhibitions on issuer
flexibility can occur.
For an illustration of this p oint consider once more

Broad v .
1
Rockwell International Corp . 7 5 and t h e cash out merger. 1 7 6 T he
original issuer is worth more to the acquiring corporation to the ex
tent its capital structure contains low coupon, fixed-rate debt, par
ticularly in a period of rising interest rates. I t is worth more still to
the extent the acquiring corporation can lay hold to such advanta
geous capitalization without conceding a claim upon its own equity.
By allocating the merger risk to the bondholders,

Broad II permits

the stockholders to keep this slice of the merger pie, even though its
very existence results from the obliteration of the bondholders' con
tract claim against the original issuer's equity. Good faith principles
counsel that the burden to justify such a substantial restructuring of
the fundamentals of the contractual relationship lie with the party
benefitted thereby, here the issuer. 1 7 7

5.

EffiCIENCY

The fairness advantages of a bondholder protective approach
must be weighed against the efficiency advantages of the traditional
approach . As already noted, the traditional approach forced the de
velopment of an efficient, if imperfect, standard form and has facili
tated swift judicial decisions. 1 7 8

175.

6H F.2d 418 ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) ,

vacated, 642 F.2d 929 ( 5th Cir.) ( en bane ) , cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1981 ) .
176.
This Article's rejection of the Broad II approach respecting cash out mergers
should not be taken as approval of the Broad I opinion. Broad I surveys the en tire trust inden
ture and finds ambiguities where none exist-in the standard provision regulating supplemen
tal indentures, for example. 614 F.2d at 427-28. On the fiduciary duty applied in Broad I, see
infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
1 77.
This analysis can be applied to a number of different cases. See, e.g . , Kessler v .
General Cable Corp. , 92 Cal. App. 3d 5 3 1 , 155 Cal. Rptr. 94 ( 1 979) ( tender offers ) ; Levine v .
Chesapeake & O.R.R., 60 A.D .2d 246, 400 N .Y.S.2d 76 ( 1 977 ) .
This line o f reasoning also may encompass Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 2 1 5 ( Del. Ch.
1 974 ) , rev'd, 347 A.2d 133 ( Del. 197 5 ) , discussed supra notes 1 12-1 3 and accompanying text.
Large, extraordinary cash dividends materially realign the relationship. Uninfom1ed bond
holders are likely to have valued the bonds assuming continued "regular" sized dividends
without awareness of the residual element of risk. See Model Simplified Indenture, supra note
69, at 804-05. O f course a difficult line-drawing problem is presented. " Regular" dividends
should not result in price adjustments. The informed market expects them, and a succession of
small, judicially-mandated conversion price adjustments in the bondholders' favor over sev
eral years might increase substantially and unexpectedly the value of the conversion privilege.
But in any event this line drawing problem probably never will reach the courts. Today's
standard form includes explicit dividend provisions. See supra note 1 14 .
178.
See supra notes 7 1-80 and accompanying text.
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Further efficiency claims can be made for the traditional ap
proach under the "costly contracting" hypothesis of financial theo
rists like .Jensen and Meckling, and Smith and Warner. This holds
out the possibility of an optimal set of financial contracts for each
firm and suggests that standard form bond contracts may be opti
mal. It asserts that bond contracts resolve stockholder-bondholder
conflicts efficiently by causing management to maximize firm value
while simultaneously reducing the monitoring and agency costs of
the stockholder-bondholder relationship to the lowest level. The
business covenants contained in bond contracts restrict self-inter
ested stockholder actions that would decrease the bonds' value, and
lower the costs bondholders otherwise would incur in monitoring
stockholder conduct. In exchange for these bondholder benefits the
issuer pays a lower interest rate. 1 7 9
The costly contracting hypothesis can b e expanded into a stan
dard microeconomic argument against any departure from the legal
status quo respecting a corporate financing device. In the context of
convertible bonds the argument would be that judicial interpolation
of bondholder protective terms, contemplated by neither the issuer
nor the well-informed class of bondholders, disturbs this optimal
contractual relationship , first, by imposing additional and unneces
sary costs on the issuer, and second , by causing the transaction costs
of modification of the standard form to obviate the judicial risk allo
cation and restore certainty. Ultimately, the risk of costly judicial
medd ling to restrain self-interested issuer conduct not explicitly
prohibited by the bond contract might cause the issuer to refrain
from taking steps which increase the overall value of the firm. 1 8 0
That an efficiency justification for contractual good faith doc
trine does not obtain in the convertible b ond context further sup
ports this view. Good faith rules that shift the drafting burden to the

179.

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 337-39; Smith & Warner, supra note 3,

at 120-22.
The costly contracting hypothesis represents one side of an ongoing debate
180.
among financial theorists on the question whether the way in which the bondholder-stock
holder conflict is controlled affects the total value of the firm. The Modigliani-Miller "irrele
vance hypothesis" embodies the opposing view. Modigliani and Miller take the position that
the value of the firm and its cost of capital are independent of its capital structure; the firm's
value is determined solely by the capitalization of its earnings stream. See Modigliani &
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. EcoN.
REV. 261 ( 1958 ) .
I f the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis i s correct, then the value o f the firm i s not a t stake
when a court decides a question of stockholder-bondholder conflict. Only wealth transfers
back and forth between bondholders and stockholders would be involved. Arguably, the Mo
digliani-Miller hypothesis sanctions more aggressive judicial umpiring of bondholder-stock
holder disputes, since only a wealth transfer is at stake.
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party best able to protect itself are said to be efficient b ecause that
party has the discretion to select the performance terms and can
cheaply draft an express limitation to the overall good faith duty.
The alternative, having the weaker party protect itself with an ex
haustive list of express promises, costs more because that party
lacks information concerning the other's discretion.

181

T his sort of

cost picture might obtain as b etween bondholders and issuers after
the initial issue and sale of the bonds, but it would not necessarily
obtain at the time the bond contract is drafted. At that p oint the
parties would be the issuer and the underwriters, and an efficiency
analysis of the allocation of the drafting burden between them
would p oint to the underwriters, whose expertise in financial affairs
would more than match the issuer's knowledge of its own future
p lans . J\!Ioreover, whichever legal approach happens to entail the
lowest cost , most of the necessary costs of clearly allocating the risks
of dilution and destruction were incurred decades ago, when stan
dard anti-dilution provisions were developed in response to the turn
of-the-century cases.
But since the basic costs of allocating the risks respecting con
vertible bonds already have been incurred , adoption of a b on dholder
protective approach should neither result in the incurrence of any
significant additional costs nor prove materially less efficient than
the traditional approach's exclusive reliance on the drafting process.
The protective approach proposed herein has a gap-filling character:
it comes into p lay only when the contract fails to allocate

a

risk and

yields to an explicit contract p rovision providing for a different re
sult. Looking once again at the large amounts of money at stake and
the eminence of the drafting counsel in each bond transaction, it
safely can be assumed that any j udicial allocation of risk seriously at
variance with expectations of issuers and informed traders promptly
and explicitly would be overridden in subsequent bond contracts. 1 8 2
O f course, this extra bit of effort is costly. But if history is any guide,
a bondholder protective result more often than not will prove conso
nant with actual market expectations. lvforeover, some of these
costs will be incurred in any event . The very existence of litigation
over an ambiguity in a clause in the standard form will cause the

181.
182.

See Burton, supra note 6 1 , a t 393-94.

Recent adjustments to the standard form to ratify the Broad I I result, see supra

note 1 7 1 , show the responsiveness of the corporate bar to new problems with the standard
language.

1984:667

Convertible Bonds

719

better informed and more cautious segment o f the corporate bar to
redraft the clause to effect a precise result . 1 8 3
With respect to bond contracts, then , efficiency requires judicial
consistency and clarity more than judicial results perfectly accord
ing with actual market expectations. The benefits of the traditional
approach now having accrued fully, it safely can be abandoned in
order to protect the expectations created by the well-drafted stan
dard form, 1 8 4 so long as its efficiency yielding aspect is carried over
into the new approach. With the ultimate power to allocate risks left
in the financial community, occasional rulings at variance with mar
ket expectations, while perhaps theoretically causing wealth trans
fers between existing bond issuers and holders, will neither cause
suboptimal bond contracting nor otherwise materially affect market
5
efficiency. 1 8

I I I . JUDICIAL REALIGNMENT OF THE CONVERTIBLE BOND
RELATIONSHIP-CONTRACT AVOIDANCE AND FIDUCIARY
RESTRAINT

Bondholder protective contract interpretation could never pro
tect all bondholder expectations. It yields to the drafter, who will
not necessarily be bondholder protective. Consider a change in the
standard form favoring the issuer . B ondholders may not pressure
issuers and underwriters to redraft the contract, but may not,

as

well, adjust their expectations. B ondholders, either lacking in so
phistication or rationally deciding to save on monitoring costs, may
fail to review and assimilate the drafter's change. If this informa
tional breakdown occurs, subsequent issuers will have little incen
tive to offer a term more favorable to the bondholders. Since the
bondholders are unlikely to notice such an issuer concession, they
are unlikely to pay for it, thus removing any competitive incentive.
The following discussion considers the proposition that such refrac-

1 83.
The cautious lawyer knows that he cannot rely upon the next court to take the
same view of the issue and in any event wishes to prevent litigation. See supra note 1 7 1 on the
bar's response to the Broad litigation.
1 84.
The approach recommended in no way impinges on the integrity of manage
ment's corporate law duty to advance stockholder interests, because it arises out of the con
tract and remains subject to control by the contracting parties.
The inquiry might be more subtle with a closely held corporation. Cj. Myers v. South
ern Nat'! Bank, 21 N . C . App. 202, 204 S.E. 2d 30 ( 1974 ) (closely held corporation buy-sell
agreement provision for a stock option contingent upon the other stockholder's death ) .
1 85 .
The question arises whether bondholder protective gap fillers similarly should
be formulated for other bondholder-stockholder conflicts. Obviously, the answer depends on
the particular kind of bond contract provision at issue and the interests at stake.

W I S C O NS I N LAW R E V I E W

720

tory bondholder expectations be protected through judicial avoid
ance of bond contract provisions or fiduciary restraints on issuers.

A . Existing Case Law
A fragmentary body of contemporary case law p rotects bond
holder expectations through avoidance of convertible bond contract
terms. These cases offer only conclusory reformulations of contract
and fiduciary 1 8 6 p rinciples to j ustify their approach.
Broad I, 1 8 7 for example, experimented with simultaneous con
tract and fiduciary duties. It imposed a good faith duty that over
rode contract terms. Under the duty, evidence that the b ondholders
expected the conversion privilege to remain intact for the life of the
bond made a jury question of the fairness of the issuer ' s diluent or
destructive action, despite an explicit contract right authorizing
such action. 1 8 8 Oddly, the accompanying fiduciary duty did not
override contract terms. It was fully discharged by compliance with
the bond contract's terms and violated only when the issuer com
mitted a bad faith breach. 1 8 9

Boeing Co. decisions 1 9 0
shared this experimental quality and doctrinal confusion . 1 9 1 I n Van
Gemert I, 1 9 2 the first of two opinions, the court imposed a "duty of
The Second Circuit 's

Van Gemert

v.

1 86.
See, e.g., Broad I, 614 F.2d at 424-25; Green v. Hamilton Int'l Corp. , 437 F.
Supp. 723, 726-28 ( S . D .N.Y. 1 977) ( G reen I). The Third Circuit's Pittsburgh Terminal opin
ions deal 'Nith the fiduciary duty question in the context of a 1 0b-5 action. The plurality opin
ion finds that the issuer-bondholder fiduciary duty provides the requisite state law duty to
disclose. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O . R.R., 680 F.2d 933, 941 ( 3 d Cir. 1 982) ,
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 475 ( 1 983) . See also Browning D ebenture H olders' Comm.
v . DASA Corp . , 560 F.2d 1 078 (2d Cir. 1977) ( d eclining to impose fiduciary duty to disclose as
a matter of federal law ) .
Green v . Hamilton Int'l Corp . , N o . 7 6 Civ. 5433, slip. o p . ( S. D .N.Y. July 1 3 , 1 98 1 )
(Green II) , holds out the intriguing prospect that breach of fiduciary duty may b e the most
effective ground for convertible bondholder challenges to issuer misstateme�ts and nondisclo
:m res. According to Green II, showings of neither materiality nor scienter are required to make
out a breach of the fiduciary duty. Proof of the fiduciary relationship and of the holders' conse
quent dependence is sufficient. See id. at 33-36.
187.
Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp . , 614 F.2d 4 1 8 ( 5th Cir. 1980 ) , vacated, 642 F'.2d
929 ( 5th Cir. ) (en bane) , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 ( 1 981 ) .
1 88. 6 1 4 F.2d at 430. The Broad I I court rejected this approach, taking t h e position
that its interpretation of the contract in the issuer's favor precluded a good faith decision for
the bondholders. 642 F.2d at 957-58.
1 89.
6 1 4 F .2d at 430-31 . See also Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 631
( Del. 1977 ) , placing the terms of the certificate of incorporation ahead of a duty to be solici
tous of the interests of preferred stockholders.
190.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co. , 520 F.2d 1 373 ( 2d Cir. ) , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947
( 1 975 ) ; 553 F .2d 812 ( 2d Cir. 1977) ( Van Gemert II).
See also infra note 226.
191.
520 F.2d 1 373 ( 2d Cir. ) , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 ( 1975) .
1 92.
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reasonable notice" o n t h e convertible bond issuer, 1 9 3 determined
that a set of standard provisions for notice of call did not measure up
to the duty, and overrode the provisions. The court held that the
notice provisions fell short in two respects. First, they did not ap
pear in the bond itself, but were buried in the bond contract where
unsophisticated investors were unlikely to see them. 1 9 4 Second, the
actual newspaper notices provided for were inadequate to inform
the unsophisticated bondholder "in Dubuque or Little Rock or
Lampasas . " 1 9 5

Accor ding to

the court,

the unsophisticated

holder 1 9 6 expects reasonable notice as well as capital appreciation
"and it is his reliance on this expectancy that the courts will pro
tect. " 1 9 7
The court' s theory in

Van Gemert I appears to go a step beyond
the Broad I court's enhanced good faith duty. Van Gemert I empha
sized b ondholder reliance, showing a tendency to conceive of the is
suer-b ondholder relationship in terms of the bondholders' depen
dence u pon the issuer as well as in terms of the b on d holders'
bargained for expectations. C oncurring in his own opinion, the au
thor of the

Van Gemert I opinion took the reliance point yet another

step closer to a fiduciary concept. Had he alone decided the case, he
would have dispensed with a contract law rationale entirely and in
voked an "underlying duty of fair treatment . . . owed by the cor
poration or majority stockholders or controlling directors and of
ficers" to the b ondholders. 1 9 8 D espite this,

a

second panel of the

same court in a later phase of the same case 1 99 reverted to the con
tractual idea of protecting bargained for expectations and labelled

Van Gemert I a "good faith" case. 2 0 0

193.

520 F.2d at 1383. A number of other cases arose on substantially the same facts

Van Gemert. The courts in each found issuer compliance with the trust indenture notice
provisions to be decisive. See Abramson v. Burroughs Corp. , FED. SEC. L. REP. C H H [ 1 971-

as

1972 transfer binder] � 93,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1 972 ) ; Kaplan v. Vornado, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2 1 2
( N . D . I l l . 197 1 ) ; Gampel v. Burlington Indus . , 4 3 Misc. 2 d 846 , 252 N.Y.S. 2 d 5 0 0 ( Sup. C t .
1954 ) ; Terrell v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp. , 496 S . W . 2 d 669 ( Tex. C i v . App. 1 973 ) . I n
Kaplan and Abramson the plaintiff tried a lOb-5 theory, based in Kaplan o n inadequate disclo
sure in the debenture form and in Abramson on inadequate disclosure in the prospectus.
Neither document was found to be materially misleading.
194.
520 F.2d at 1383.
195.
Id. at 1 379, 1 383.
1 96.
The Van Gemert holders were hapless indeed. As the result of missing the call
notice, the plaintiff failed to convert prior to the call date and thereby failed to realize on a
substantial increment of conversion value over call price.
197.
520 F.2d at 1 385.
Id. at 1 382-83 n.19 ( Oakes, J.).
198.
1 99.
Van Gemert II, 553 F.2d 8 1 2 ( 2d Cir. 1 977 ) .
Id. at 8 1 5 .
200.
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Like

Van Gemert I, the Third Circuit's Pittsburgh Terminal v .
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 2 0 1 decision imposed a notice duty on
the issuer based on overlapping good faith and fiduciary theories.
The

Pittsburgh Terminal issuer failed to give the bondholders ad

vance warning of a large spin-off. Conversion prior to the record
date for the spin-off would have been a value maximizing action for
bondholders, because the governing anti-dilution clause did not pro
vide for a conversion price adj ustment in the spin-off's wake. 2 0 2
Reading

Van Gemert I and Pittsburgh Terminal together, we see

an issuer duty to give adequate notice respecting matters material
to the conversion decision. This particularized bondholder p rotec
tive and contract overriding duty may be here to stay, whereas

Broad I's more expansive imposition of fairness restraints directly
on diluent and destructive corporate actions is not. Broad I I em
phatically rejected Broad I and declined to extend Van Gemert I, but
did not question the notice duty's validity.
A similar distinction between notice and more broadly ranging
fairness duties was drawn in the original sequence of cases re

Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. 2 0 3
Transamerica Corp. 2 0 4 In Zahn the Third C ircuit im

straining destructive issuer action,
and

Speed

v.

p osed a fiduciary duty directly against the exercise of call rights by
an issuer where the call negatively o.ffected conversion value, 2 0 5 but

201.
680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1982 ) , cert. denied,
U.S. _, 103 S.Ct. 475 ( 1983 ) . A
related case, Lowry v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 7 1 1 F.2d 1 20 7 (3d Cir . ) , (en bane ) , cert. denied,
_ U.S. _, 1 0 4 S.Ct. 238 ( 1983 ) , saw the Pittsburgh Terminal panel's disagreements echoed
by members of the court sitting en bane. See also Green I, 437 F. Supp. at 729 n .4; Green II,
No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 1 3 , 1981 ) .
202. 680 F.2d at 936-38. Judge Gibbons' opinion treats the bondholders' claim under
Rule 1 0b-5; the contract law duty to speak is utilized to provide the duty to speak required in
a 1 0b-5 action by Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 ( 1980 ) .
Judge Garth's concurring opinion avoids the contract good faith notice question by
predicating the 1 0b-5 duty to disclose on Rule 1 0b-17. 680 F.2d at 944-,17 ( Garth, J.,
concurring).
Judge Adams' dissent applies the Broad I I approach. The absence of contractual notice
provisions or anti-dilution adjustments decides the good faith point: "By its terms, the princi
ple of fair dealing . . . applies only when one party infringes the other's rights 'to receive the
fruits of the contract. ' Here, under the well-settled Parkinson doctrine, Pittsburgh Terminal
had no right, under the contract, to receive advance notice of the . . . dividend . . . . " Id. at
951-52 ( Adams, J., dissenting).
Under the analysis of this Article, the good faith issue would be decided in the bondholder's favor as a matter of contract interpretation.
162 F.2d 36 ( 3d Cir. 1 947 ) .
203.
235 F.2d 369 ( 3d Cir. 1956 ) .
204.
205. Zahn and Speed concern an issue of preferred stock ( termed " Class A common"
but preferred in all substantive respects) , convertibie into common ( termed " Class B com
mon " ) on a one-to-one basis and having a two-to-one liquidation preference. At the time of
the issuer action challenged in the case, conversion value substantially exceeded the c al l price
and liquidation value substantially exceeded both. The is.s uer, planning to liquidate, called
_
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then backed away from this direct restraint in

Speed, the damages
Speed affirmed the issuer 's discretion to exer
cise call rights in its own interest, and granted damages to the Zahn
plaintiffs as if liability in Zahn had been based on the issuer 's failure

phase of the same case.

to notify them of material facts that would have prompted conver
sion prior to the call date.

206

D espite all the doctrinal avenues they travel, these cases fail to
grapple directly with the basic issue they all share: whether the ben
efits stemming from judicial protection of uninformed bondholders
justify inefficiencies stemming from mandatory judicial regulation
of the bond contract's allocation of risks. The following subpart con
siders this issue . It concludes that courts should avoid overriding
provisions which, like anti-dilution clauses, allocate substantive
risks, but justifiably may impose additional notice requirements.

B. Overriding the Bond Contract Under Contract Law
Applying contract avoidance principles to bond contract provi
sions seems a frivolous exercise at first . The drafter is generally as
sumed to have the final world in competitive financial transactions.
Standard form anti-dilution provisions fit into this mold-they re
sult from on-going competition between issuers and investors and do
not disproportionately favor the issuer . Barriers to the full circula

tion of information do result in

a

vulnerable class of uninformed in-

the preferred without informing the holders of these values. The holders, under the impression
that the call price exceeded conversion value, intentionally failed to convert prior to redemp
tion. The . result, upon the issuer's liquidation, was a vastly increased participation for the
common. Zahn, 162 F.2d at 38-4 1 . See also Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226,
173 S.W. 2d 377 ( 1 943).
In Zahn, the Third Circuit imposed a fiduciary duty on the issuer not to redeem the
stock at all, because the single largest common stockhoider controlled the issuer's board and
the board's action benefitted the common to the preferred's detriment. In reaching this con
clusion, the court sidestepped the governing contract provisions in the certificate of incorpora
tion with a conclusory imputation to the certificate's drafters of an intention that the board
act disinterestedly in calling the stock. Zahn, 162 F.2d at 46.
The court's sidestep is indefensible. Whether the subject co!lvertibles are bonds or pre
ferred, call rights necessarily embody a contractual reservation of a privilege to act in the
interests of the common. Assuming no change in prevailing rates of interest, cail is rational
only if conversion value equals or exceeds the call price. Zahn's fiduciary restrictions on calls
advancing stockholder interests frustrates the intent of the drafter and in effect voids the call
provision.
206.
Speed sustained an award of damages based on the liquidation value of the un
derlying common and refused damages based on the liquidation value of the unconverted
preferred. Speed v . Transamerica Corp. , 235 F.2d at 374.
Like the Van Gemert and Pittsburgh Terminal notification duties, the Speed duty admits
of characterization as a product both of the issuer's contractual good faith duties and its fidu
ciary duties.
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vestors, but any resulting competitive imbalance is held in check b y
market pricing that responds t o valuations mostly made by well
informed investors. The competitive picture is drastically different
in a classic avoidance case such as
tors. 2 0 7

Henningsen

v.

Bloomfield Mo

Consideration of the bond contract's history, however, shows
judicial control of bond contract terms to be a serious proposition.
Llewellyn singled out financial contracts for regulation in his basic
work on adhesion contracts. 2 0 8 And far from being held sacred , the
terms of the public issue bond contract have been regulated inten
sively by both courts and legislatures. Courts forced indenture
trustees to assume fiduciary duties decades ago and in so doing over
rode explicit exculpatory provisions in the bond contract. 2 0 9 T he
Trust Indenture Act of 1 939, 2 1 0 which applies to every public issue

bond contract, prescribes verbatim inclusion of provisions contain
ing minimum standards of conduct for the trustee. Both instances of
regulation stemmed from a judgment of market failure to p roduce
contractual mechanisms adequate to protect the bondholders ' inter
ests. 2 1 1
Contract law avoidance doctrines stand ready to afford j ustifi
cation should contemporary courts decide that further regulation of
bond contracts is needed to protect bondholder interests. Not only
the enhanced good faith principles invoked in Broad I and the Van
Gemert opinions, 2 1 2 but avoidance doctrines developed for adhesion

207.
32 N.J. 358, 1 61 A.2d 69 ( 1960 ) . There oligopoly power resulted in greatly une
qual bargaining strength and a wholly one-sided form contract.
Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 , at 733-34.
208.
See Dabney v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 196 F.2d 668 ( 2d Cir. 1952 ) , 2 0 1 F.2d 635 ( 2d
209.
Cir. 1953 ) ; York v. Guaranty Trust Co. , 143 F.2d 503 ( 2d Cir. 1944 ) , rev'd on other grounds,
326 U.S. 99 ( 1945 ) . Hazzard v. Chase Nat'! Bank, 1 59 Misc. 57, 287 N.Y.S. 5 4 1 ( Sup. Ct.
1936 ) , is a leading case going the other way. See also Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 , at 733.
1 5 U .S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb ( 1982 ) .
210.
See § 302(a) ( 6 ) o f the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb ( a ) ( 6 ) ( 1 982). See also SECURITIES
211.
AND EXCHANGE CoMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVI
TiES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 2-3 ( pt .
V I 1936 ).
212. Never packaged for general application, the contract overriding good faith duty
has been associated with employment contracts, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass . 96, 364 N.E.2d 1 25 1 ( 1977), and insurance contracts, see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
66 Cal.2d 425, ,126 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 ( 1967 ) ; Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50
Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 ( 1958) . Both of these areas tend to entail greater bargaining dispar
ity than does the typical public issue bond contract.
See generally Burton, supra note 6 1 , at 372 n.l7, 394-95 n. l09. The duty is an extension
of the traditional duty to cooperate in the other party's performance. See, e.g., Barron v. Cain,
216 N . C . 282, 4 S.E.2d 618 ( 1 939 ) ; Iron Trade Prod. Co. v. Wilkoff Co., 272 Pa. 172, 1 16 A.
150 ( 1922) .
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contracts 2 1 3 are available. B ond contracts are inherently adhesive
because the

post facto nature of the holder's entry into the relation
ship prevents all bargaining other than over price. T he Restatement
(Second) of Contracts provides a b asis for small scale attacks on par
ticular adhesive provisions in order to remedy informational dispari
ties. 2 1 4 A b ondholder could utilize it if, as seems plausible, it could
be shown that convertible bond issuers have reason to know that
many bondholders are uninformed regarding fine points in the bond
contract, and that such provisions frustrate "dominant" bond
holder expectations. 2 1 5

1.

D ILUENT AND DESTRUCTIVE PROVISIONS

These neoclassical avoidance doctrines should not be applied
too rigidly . O therwise, they would create an avoidance case every
time a contract term frustrates a party's reasonable expectations.
They best are approached as invitations to painstaking relational
inquiries into the fairness and efficiency of avoidance. Thus, in the
convertible bond context the avoidance inquiry raises again all the
conflicting considerations which went into the interpretation discus
sion in Part I I of this Article.
We first consider the avoidance case respecting bond contract
provisions permitting dilution and destruction. The case is close.
Such diluent provisions frustrate bondholder expectations. These
frustrated expectations are much smaller in magnitude than in the
usual avoidance case. The group interested in the bond contract
tends to be sophisticated, making cases of other mass produced fi
nancial contracts, such as insurance policies, easily distinguishable
because the unsophisticated general public has the primary stake in
6
such contracts. 2 1 Even focusing solely on the expectations of unin
formed bondholders, diluent and destructive actions only partially

213.
Both contract overriding good faith duty and adhesion contract avoidance doc
trine commission the courts to protect the weaker party's expectations from the contract
rights of the stronger party. They differ as to the means to that end. Adhesion contract doc
trine looks at the terms of the writing and avoids hidden fine print found unacceptable in the
overall circumstances of the contract relation. Good faith arises from the circumstances of the
particular contract relation. It imposes duties independent of the terms of the contract and
may override terms whether or not buried in hidden fine print.
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 1 1 comment f ( 1981 ) .
214.
Carried to its logical conclusion, this approach would approximate Professor
215.
Keeton's rule for insurance policies: no qualifications inconsistent with expectations of a
holder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of instrument in question should
be enforced. See Keeton, supra note 174, at 968-69.
216.
Professor Keeton formulates an unconscionability rule which results in per se
invalidation of provisions which mislead most insurance policy holders. Keeton, supra note
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frustrate such expectations. 'Take a n uninformed investor w h o p ays

$ 1 0 0 0 for a convertible bond una·ware of limitations on the conver
sion privilege and expecting complete protection. Although such an
investor would not manifest assent to the contract at a p rice of

$ 1 0 0 0 if he knew of the limitation, he might, depending on his risk
$800 or $990. And even if an unex

preferences, manifest assent for

pected diluent event occurs, the bon d 's debt value limits the magni
tude of his disappointed expectations.
In addition to these individual benefits, avoidance increases in
vestor confidence in the market. It also would reduce the agency
costs of subsequent transactions, causing lower coupon rates. 2 1 7
Now contrast the undesirable effects of judicial bon d contract
avoidance. First comes the wealth transfer phenomenon d iscussed in
connection with bondholder protective contract interpretation . 2 1 8
Avoiding a term favoring the issuer will make the bond more valu
able, transferring wealth from the stockholders to the bondholders.
B ut the transfer will be greater in magnitude than in an interpreta
tion case. Since avoidance concerns explicit terms rather than ambi
guities and omissions, the market's valuation of the b onds will tend
to reflect clear contractual expectations regarding the allocation of
risk rather than uncertainty.
Second, and perhaps more significant, are the costs of the uncer
tainty and technical problems caused by j udicial bond contract
avoidance. The courts in theory would alter contract terms to con
form to investor expectations. As

practical matter, however,

a

courts do not have the resources to ascertain the actual expectations
of a group of bondholders. But if they did , inquiry would show that
even among the informed bondholder group no monolithic expecta
tion exists for quick translation into

a

trust indenture p rovision. In

the end , therefore, the courts would be basing avoidance and substi
tute provisions on intuition. Line drawing prob lems and conflicting
judicial rulings easily could result, along with all associated costs.
These uncertainty costs are likely to be higher than the uncer
tainty costs of intuitive judicial interpretation . The yielding aspect

of rules of interpretation make certainty the end result by returning

174, at 974. In Keeton's view, some provisions a;:e so complex that they cannot be brought to

hoiders' attention in the ordinary marketing situation. Id.
217.

The scenario is

as

follows. Bondholders come to expect judicial protection

against opportunistic issuer conduct. Since judicial prctectiDn reduces the r.isks of holding
bonds and the bond market is competitive, the return required on bonds declines. For discus
sion of agency costs and judicial protection oi

common

stockhoiclers against management mis

conduct, see Scott, Corporation Law and the A merican Law Instit·ute Corporate Governance

Project, 35 STAN. L. REV.

218.

927 ( 1983 ) .

See strpm text accon;panying notes 1 58-60.

1984:667

Convertible Bonds

727

the subject matter to the marketplace for explicit treatment in fu
ture bond contracts. Moreover, some interpretation is unavoidable,
since there is no such thing as perfect drafting. In contrast, courts
avoiding bond contract terms create uncertainty because the bond
market cannot absolutely rely on the enforceability of bond contract
provisions. Given case-by-case balancing of particular deprivations
of uninformed bondholder expectations against issuer expectations
and the need for certainty, even an efficient market would be hard
pressed accurately to quantify the likelihood of avoidance. The re
sulting uncertainty would reduce the bonds' utility as a financing
instrument.
Finally, even though judicial regulation of terms to protect
bondholders reduces agency costs in future transactions, it may not
improve on the standard form' s efficiency. Costs or other factors
may make the contract worth more to the issuer if a given risk is
allocated to the bondholders than the contract is worth to the bond
holders if such risk is allocated to the issuer. Since efficiency is a
function of these subjective valuations of risk, judge-made terms
formulated to protect the uninformed subgroup of bondholders are
unlikely to be as efficient as standard terms formulated through the
marketplace interaction of issuers, underwriters and informed bond
holders. One may object that with an obscure risk there arises the
real possibility of a widespread informational breakdown regarding
the contract provision allocating it and the real possibility that such
provision does not embody an exchange between the issuer and the
bondholders at all, much less an efficient one. The problem is that
courts have no practical way of confirming whether this sort of infor
mational breakdown in fact has occurred .
As a practical matter, o f course, the market could adjust t o all
manner of disruption and uncertainty resulting from judicial avoid
ance of bond contract terms. 2 1 9 One suspects that only avoidance of
fundamental terms, such as those setting interest rates and prepay
ment rights, seriously would impair market processes and the utility
of the convertible bond contract as a financing tool. A voidance of
such terms is unlikely. The more fundamental the term, the less
likely it is there will be a significant informational disparity regard
ing it, and the less likely will be the need for judicial intervention on
behalf of uninformed bondholders.

219.
Convertible bonds survived the treatment of turn-of-the-century jurists, which
bespeaks a certain resiliency in the securities markets. See supra notes 55-62 and accompany
ing text. B ut then so does their survival of federal regulation and the corporate governance
movement.
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Legislation promulgated by either Congress, the Securities Ex
change Commission or the N ew York Stock Exchange could provide
a better means of achieving bondholder protection than does

ad hoc

judicial avoidance. Any one of several legislative approaches could
be taken. A statute or stock exchange rule might regulate contract
terms, mandating express provisions in the manner of the Trust In
denture Act. Such legislation, while removing the risk-allocating
function from the marketplace, at least would not sacrifice the cer
tainty of terms required for accurate market pricing. Alternatively,
legislation might require the marketplace to inform the uninformed
bondholder. This would require abandoning the present prospectus
based disclosure model, with its hyper-technical descrip tions of con
tract language, and its exclusive focus on new issues. 2 2 0 The prob
lem calls for delivering the simplest possible explanation of the risks
of convertible bondholding to all market purchasers of con

vertibles. 2 2 1 Finally, the entire burden of educating investors prior

to purchase of a convertible could be imposed on brokers through a
particularized application of the S E C 's suitability requirement. 2 2 2
Since none of these legislative solutions is likely in the foresee
able future, the j udicial intervention issue cannot be avoide d . This
subpart has shown that the problem stems not from any intrinsic
unfairness in the standard form , but from disparate investor infor
mation levels. 2 2 3 At least as regards anti-dilution provisions and
other provisions allocating substantive risks, convertible bonds
present a comparatively small information prob lem. Judicial inter
vention, however, carries a cognizable risk of minor market ineffi
ciencies. T he balance falls against intervention .

2.

NOTICE

The case for an issuer duty to give reasonable notice of actions
bearing materially on the conversion decision is marginally stronger
than the case for overriding anti-dilution and other substantive pro
visions. The two cases share the objective of protecting bon dholders
from imperfect information dissemination, but differ in their means
to this end. Avoidance of substantive provisions remedies the failure

220.

See supra note 130 for a description of the prevailing standards for p rospectus

disclosure of bond contract terms.

1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z ( 1982) ,
U.S.C. §§ 2303-2304 ( 1982 ) .

221 .

The model here is less the Securities Act of

222.

S ee 17 C.F.R. § 240. 15bl0-3 ( 1 982 ) , which provides that market professionals

than the provisions o f the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 1 5

making recommendations to customers have "reasonable grounds to believe that the recom
mendation is not unsuitable for such customer . . . .

223.

"

See s upra text accompanying notes 129-42.

1984: 667

Convertible Bonds

729

of market information channels to make all contract risks clear to all
investors prior to bond p urchase by shifting the risks. In contrast,
the notice cases leave the holder bearing the risk of the issuer action.
They involve judicial intervention only to assure that the holder has
the information necessary to take value-maximizing steps in re
sponse. 2 24
B oth the costs and the benefits of the notice duty are fewer than
those respecting avoidance of substantive provisions. T he benefits
are reduced because the practical protective effect fluctuates with
the market. However well-notified the bondholder, forced choice be
tween conversion and redemption will be a Hobson's choice if the
conversion price exceeds conversion value. The costs are reduced be
cause notice duties create less of an uncertainty problem. Notice du
ties lend themselves to precise statement and , to the extent that
lines need to be drawn, a highly developed jurisprudence provides
guidance. Notice duties also leave management free to take
whatever stockholder beneficial action it deems appropriate.
This is not to say that notice duties will not confer unearned
benefits on well-informed bondholders or disturb efficient allocations
of risk. The standard form provides for advance notice of dividends

out of surpius, rights offerings, mergers, large asset sales, recapitali
zations, and liquidations, 2 2 5 in addition to the anti-dilution provi
sions covering these events. Additional judge-made notice require
ments therefore shift back to the issuer monitoring costs that the
contract p laces on the holders. Theoretically, this disrupts the pric

ing assumptions of the issuer and well-informed investors, causing

yet another wealth transfer to well-informed investors. But this ef
fect would be temporary. Furthermore, judicial notice duties cannot
be particularly inefficient so long as their materiality standard has a

basis in reality. If the information subject to the duty has economic
significance to the bondholders, issuers will receive compensation for
bearing the duty in subsequent transactions.

in Speed and Pittsburgh Terminal in effect requires disclosure
management's intention to take action materially affecting conver
sion values. See supra notes 20 1-06 and accompanying text. Van Gemert requires the issuer to
ta!l.e ste p s to assure the widest possible dissemination of widely disseminated market informa
tion. Thus, Speed and Pittsbu.rgh Terminal, like Rule l Ob-5 and other federal disclosme re
quirements, proted out3ide investors at all levels of sophistication, while Van Gemert, like
other good faith based decisions respecting bond contracts, sp ac ifically protects Uilinformed
224.

The duty imposed

of inside information of

iw.:estors.

225.

See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2 , at 556-.57 ( Sample

Provision § 13-10).
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In sum, the innocuous nature of the costs o f judicially imposed
notice requirements may make the resulting bondholder protective
benefits worthwhile. 2 2 6

C. Fiduciary Duties t o Convertible Bondholders
In addition to extending the benefits of neoclassical contract
avoidance principles to convertible bondholders, some of the case
law imposes a fiduciary duty upon the issuer. 2 2 7 The following is a
preliminary appraisal of this duty.
1.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO BONDHOLDERS AND TRADITIONAL N O T IONS
OF CORPORATE STRUCTURE

Clearly articulated doctrinal theories support excluding b ond
holders from the protection of corporate fiduciary duties. The tradi
tional fiduciary duties of the corporation's directors, officers and
other employees spring from their agency relationships with the cor
poration. They are owed to the corporate entity as principal , rather
than to individual stockholders or creditors. 2 2 8 Because the corpo
ration is the beneficiary of these duties, it must be the p laintiff in
actions to enforce them. 2 2 9 The stockholders' right to sue deriva-

226.
One caveat based on Van Gernert should be entered. I t purported to protect
uninformed investors by requiring a clearer description of notice provisions on the bond itself
and publication of additional notices of call in a newspaper oi general circulation in Manhat
tan between 30 and 90 days prior to the redemption date. 520 F.2d at 1 376. One doubts that
these additional notices actually would catch the unsophisticated investor's eye. Van Gernert
naively supposes that the uninformed investor reads the fine print on the back of the bond and
monitors the Wall Street Journal for call notices. At least one observer tells us that some
investors sleep so deeply that only full registration, notification by certified mail and follow up
telephone calls will flush out 1 0 0 % of an issue for conversion prior to the redemption date.
Miller, How to Call Your Convertibles, 49 HARV. B us. REV. , May-June 1 97 1 , at 66-68.
The case's result can still be j ustified as an ad hoc remedy for a particular denial of
bondholder expectations. That the opinion lays down an unworkable rule, while not a point in
its favor, is not much of an objection either. The costs imposed on issuers were trivial and the
set of situations to which the rule was to apply was fast disappearing.
227.
See supra notes 1 86-206 and accompanying text.
Neither Broad II, 642 F.2d at 940 n . 1 0 , 958-59, nor the dissenting opinion in Pittsburgh
Terminal, 680 F .2d at 946-52, 954 n . l l ( A dams, J . , dissenting) categorically rejects the propo
sition that a fiduciary duty to the bondholders exists. B oth contain a strong edge of skepti
cism, however.
228. See Clark v. Lawrence, 5 Fed. Cas. 888 ( C. C . D . Ma.."S. 1 856) ( N o . 282 7 ) ( Curtis,
J . ) ; Allen v. Cochran, 1 60 La. 425, 1 07 So. 292 ( 1 926 ) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
1 4 C ( 1 958 ) .
229.
Agents are not liable for harm t o persons other than their principals. R ESTATE
MENT ( SECOND) OF AGENCY § 352 ( 1958 ) . See also W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO
RATIONS 865 ( 4th ed. 1969 ) .
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tively does n o t extend to creditors; 2 3 0 thus, creditors cannot enforce
these duties. Furthermore, no fiduciary duties directly arise between
the corporate entity and its creditors b ecause no agency or trust re
lationship exists between them ; 2 3 1 the relationship is contractual.
Taken together, the black letter proposition emerges that creditors
have an inherently and exclusively contractual relationship with the
2
corporation. 2 3
Much of the force of this traditional analysis has dissipated
under the weight of accumulated, often successful, challenges to its
underlying assumptions. Consider first the weakening of other black
letter divisions of corporate relationships into neat corporate and
contract categories. Corporate law used to tolerate only limited con
tractual alteration of the terms governing relationships between the
corporation and its stockholders. 2 3 3 T oday, at least with respect to
closely held corporations, contractual arrangements between stock
holders may restrict the exercise of management discretion granted
under the pure corporate model in much the same manner as cove�
nants in bond contracts have done all along. 2 34

230.
rivatively

Courts have categorically rejected bondholder assertions oi standing t o sue de

for the corporation , see Harff

rev'd o n other grounds, 347

v.

Kerkorian , 324 A . 2d 215, 218- 1 9 ( D el. Ch. 1974 ) ,

A.2d 133 ( Del. 1 975), even though

stockholder and convertible

bondholder interests often converge with respect to enforcement against management
breaches of its duties of care and loyalty.
Convertible bondholder and warrantholder derivative actions in

federal courts assert

ing claims based on the federal securities laws have met with more success. Federal investor
protective policies are used to j ustify them.

See

Hoff v.

Sprayregan, 52 F R .D . 243 ( S. D . N . Y .
.

1971 ) ; Verrey v. Ellsworth, 303 F. Supp. 497 ( S. D . N . Y . 1969) ; En tel v. Guilden, 223 F. Supp.

129 ( S . D . N . Y . 1 963 ) . For commentary, see Levrnore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial
and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 80-82 ( 1 982) ; Note, Stockholder's Derivative Actions by
Holders of Convertible Debentures, 6 U. M IC H J. L. REF. 760 ( 1 97 3 ) ; Note, Hoff and Harff: Does
the Convertible Debenture Holder have Standing to Maintain a Shareholder Derivative Action?, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 730 ( 1 975); Note, Creditors' Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corpora
tions, 88 YALE L.J. 1299 ( 1 979) .
See Briggs v . Spaulding, 141 U.S. 1 32, 1 47 ( 1 891 ) ; Allen v . Cochran, 160 La.
231 .
.

425, 1 07 So. 292 ( 1 926 ) .
232.

Note that creditors have limited liability because o f their lack o f management

See generally D ouglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Interfer
ence with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW. 343 ( 1975 ) .
control.

233.

The theory was that such agreements unduly impinged o n the board of direc

tors' discretion to operate the corporation.

See, e.g.,

Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New

Bruns

wick Theatres C o . , 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N . E .2d 633 ( 1 948) ; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N .Y.

323, 189 N.E. 234 ( 1 934 ) . Ironically, the cases undercut the strict contract view of creditor
participation b y putting the interests of creditors forward as

one

question of the validity of i mp i n gi n g agreements. See Galler
N . E . 2d 577, 584 ( 1%4 ) ; Clark

234.

v.

v,

of the factors relevant to the

Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 29, 203

Dodge, 269 N .Y. 4 1 0 , 415, 199 N . E . 64 1 , 642 ( 1 936 ) .

The provisioP..s at issue i n V/estland Capitol Corp. v . Lucht Eng'g Inc., 308

N . W . 2d 709 ( Minn,

1 98 1 ) provide good examples.
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Consider further the central point that corporate fiduciary du
ties arise only out of agency relationships. Fifty years ago many
courts permitted this point to block duties running from maj ority to
minority stockholders, as well as duties from issuer to bondholder.
The rule as to stockholders was similar to that applied to creditors:
absent "fraud " stockholders owed one another no duties. 2 3 5 D espite
the absence of agency relationships between the stockholders, this
rule long since has yielded to a duty arising from the maj ority's
power to control the business. 2 3 6
No obscure doctrinal complications prevent a court from using
the same control of assets rationale as the basis for extending fiduci
ary protections to convertible bondholders . 2 3 7 Alternatively, a
court could characterize the conversion privilege as an " e quity" in
vestment and draw a duty out of the bondholders' dependence on
management's greater expertise and knowledge concerning the con
duct of the business. 2 3 8
Contemporary academic analyses of the nature of fiduciary du
ties also undercut the traditional analysis. These extract generally
applicable concepts of the essential fiduciary obligation from its par
ticularized manifestations in agency and trust relationships. Profes
sor Arthur Jacobson carries this line of analysis to its farthest point,
defining the fiduciary obligation as the "exercise of j udgment on be
half of another . " 2 3 9 This flexible concept perm its us to identify nu
merous interrelating fiduciary obligations in corporate structures. I t
also permits u s t o identify obligations arising in contractual rela
tionships as fiduciary. Under this concept the convertible bond rela
tionship is fiduciary: the issuer 's investment of the proceeds of the

235.
See, e.g., Palmbaum v. Maguisky, 217 Mass. 306, 104 N . E . 746 ( 1 9 1 4 ) ( forgive
ness of note invalid as consideration for voting agreement as fraud on other stockholders ) .
See N . LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 169 ( 197 1 ) .
236.
See Broad I, 614 F.2d at 430; Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. , 1 62 F .2d 36, 46 ( 3d
237.
Cir. 1947 ) .
238.
See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v . Baltimore & O.R.R. , 690 F . 2 d a t 933, 941-42
(3d Cir. 1982 ) ( plurality opinion of Gibbons, J . ) , cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 1 03 S.Ct. 475
( 1983 ) ; Green I, 437 F. Supp. at 729; Green II, No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. at 33 ( S. D .N .Y . July
13, 1 981 ) .
239.
See Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries, 3
CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 527 ( 1982) . J.C. Shepherd's definition is slightiy narrower: "A fiduciary
relationship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any type on condition that he also
receive with it a duty to utilize that power in the best interests of another, and the recipient of
the power uses that power." J. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FiDUCIARIES 96 ( 1981 ) . For other
theories narrower still, but general nonetheless, see Shepherd's discussion, id. at 51-91. See
also Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 795 , 808-09 ( 1983 ) .
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sale of the bond involves the exercise of judgment on behalf of the
holders. 2 4 0
Thus the traditional doctrinal analysis supporting the black let
ter line that blocks extension of fiduciary protections to bondholders
has given way. But it should be noted that some practical justifica
tions against extending fiduciary protections to bondholders sur
vive, albeit with substantially diminished force. One such justifica
tion is the judgment that so long as the corporate debtor remains
able to repay the debt, creditors' interests have not been impaired
sufficiently to justify legal restraints on the corporation's self-inter
ested actions. A different judgment is made regarding insolvent cor
porate debtors. Because insolvency j eopardizes repayment , the bal
ance of interests shifts to favor the creditors, giving rise to creditor
protection in law . 2 4 1 Thus, when the D elaware Chancery in Harff v.

Kerkorian 2 42 tells us that the b lack letter line yields to "fraud, insol

vency or a violation of a statute, " 2 4 3 the "fraud" very well may be a
fraud on creditors and the "statute" the legal capital provisions of
the D elaware corporation law. 2 44 These rules restrain self-inter
ested conduct of the corporation's affairs by management and stock
holders for the creditors' benefit , just as corporate fiduciary princi
ples restrain self-interested conduct of the corporation's affairs by

management and controlling stockholders for the stockholders' ben
efit. 2 4 5

240.
Cf. Jacobson, supra note 239, at 527-28, discussing the fiduciary nature of a sale
of goods. It is less clear whether Shepherd's theory, see supra note 239, encompasses bond
relationships. It would seem to depend on whether Shepherd's concept of power encompasses
the investment of borrowed money.
241 . The point where balance shifts is identified in UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
AcT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 1 6 1 ( 1978 ) , which provides as follows:
Evr:ry conveyance made without fair consideration when the person making it
is engaged or is about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property
remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, is
fraudulent as to creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the
continuance of such business or transaction without regard to his actual intent.
Id. at 237. Professor Clark notes that, literally applied, this provision vitiates corporate ac
tions advancing stockholder or management interests taken just prior to insolvency. Clark,
supra. note 5, at 510 n . 1 5 .
Traditional state legal capital provisions also may restrict transfers o f assets out o f the
corporation prior to insolvency. The degree of restriction depends on the structure of the cor
poration's capital accounts and is subject to manipulation by the issuer and its stockholders.
See generally B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 84-90 (2d ed. 1 98 1 ) .
324 A.2d 2 1 5 ( Del. Ch. 1 974) , rev'd, 347 A .2d 1 33 ( Del. 1 97 5 ) .
242.
243.
324 A.2d at 222.
See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 2 1 .
244.
See Clark, supra note 5 . The "normative ideals of fraudulent conveyance law"
245.
described by Clark, id. at 508-13, could be recast as the ideals of management and majority
stockholder fiduciary duties.
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No change i n financial fundamentals has altered t h e interests of
stockholders and creditors of solvent corporations so as to change
the relative weights of the interests thus balanced. Even so, the con
clusion that creditors deserve no legal protection other than that
reserved in a contract no longer holds as an absolute p roposition.
Congress decided that bondholders deserve quite a bit of legal pro
tection, at least so far as concerns their information levels, when it
enacted the federal securities laws. By extending the federal securi
ties laws' protections to bondholders as well as stockholders, 2 4 6
Congress opened the door to further judicial traversals of the barri
ers to legal protection of bondholders. Decades of pari passu federal
law treatment of stockholders and bondholders 2 4 7 have accustomed
the courts to looking beyond the differences between the two and
towards their common protective needs. 2 4 8
Importantly, a justification keyed to the relative interests of
stockholders and creditors only partially applies to hybrid securities
like convertibles. The conversion privilege creates an additional
bundle of bondholder interests to be thrown into the balance. One
court, recognizing this, hit upon the neat solution of extend ing man
agement fiduciary duties to convertible bondholders only in cases
where the "wrongs alleged [impinge] upon the equity aspects . . . [of
the bond] . " 2 4 9

246.
Both the Securities Act of 1 933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77ddd ( 1 982) , and the Securi
ties Exchange Act of 1 934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk ( 1 982 ) , accomplish full inclusion of debt
securities by incorporating them in their respective definitions of "security. "
247.
I t comes as n o surprise that the universal citation t o support the existence of
fiduciary duties to creditors is an opinion of Justice Douglas, a major figure in the early history
of the Securities Exchange Commission. The case is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 ( 1939 ) ,
which concerned the equitable subordination i n bankruptcy of a judgment obtained b y the
controlling stockholder after the corporation became insolvent but before it declared bank
ruptcy. Justice Douglas described quite strict "fiduciary standards of conduct which [the con
trolling stockholder] owes the corporation, its stockholders and creditors. " 308 U.S. at 3 1 1 .
Broad as the Pepper language may be, put i n the context o f the facts o f the case i t only
supports the proposition that the law imposes duties to creditors on controlling stockholders
after insolvency. This fundamental proposition has always constituted an exception to the
state law contract and corporate law dichotomy. See supra note 241 . Thus narrowly read, the
case does not support duties to creditors prior to insolvency.
248.
There may be more common ground from the average investor's point of view
than from the average corporate lawyer's point of view. According to Llewellyn:
My eyes may be blinded, but to me men do not seem to regard as going to the essence
(as distinct from questions of degree of security, and priority in rank) that the legal
sanction in the case of bonds goes to payment of certain sums at certain times; while
in the case of stocks the legal obligation is built around rather than focussed on pay
ment, built in terms of limiting dissipation in terms of asse ts and checking manipula
tion rather than in terms of specified positive performance.
Llewellyn, supra note 7 1 , at 7 2 1 .
249.

Green I I , No. 76 Civ. 5433, slip op. a t 17 ( S. D . N Y. July 13, 1 981 ) .
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An additional practical supp ort for the black letter barrier to
fiduciary protection of bondholders comes from the agency law
maxim that an agent cannot fully serve two principals . 2 5 0 In the
context of the corporate structure, the maxim tells us that fiduciary
duties running from management to groups having dependent con
tract relationships with the corporation, such as suppliers, custom
ers, and creditors, ultimately conflict with and undermine manage
m e n t ' s f u n d a m e n t a l d u t y t o m a x i m i z e returns to c o m m on

stockholders. 2 5 1

But even this justification no longer serves as an absolute bar.
More than one generation of commentators by now have urged that
the system of management duties centered upon single-minded de
votion to stockholder interests be scrapped in favor of a system in
which management takes a disinterested, conflict-resolving role for
the benefit of all parties interested in the corporation, whether such
interests arise contractually or otherwise. 2 5 2

2.

FI DU C I A RY DUTIES TO BONDHOLDERS AND THE BOND CONTRACT

The preceding discussion, showing that no doctrinal barrier
bars fiduciary restraints from the convertible bond relationship and
that the broadest notions of fiduciary obligation encompass the con
vertible bond relationship, d oes not complete the inquiry. The
properties of this particular fidu ciary obligation remain to be
identified .
The following discussion proj ects the effects of applying fiduci
ary principles to the convertible bond relationship . It turns out that
fiduciary protections work at cross-purposes with the management
stockholder relationship, once more confirming the maxim that an
agent cannot fully serve two principals. I t also turns out that fiduci-

250.
251 .
252.

RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 ( 1 958) embodies this principle.

See, e.g., Dodge v . Ford Motor Co., 204 M ich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 ( 19 1 9 ) .
The positions of an earlier generation were put forward by Berle and Dodd.

Compare A. B ERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 ( 1954 ) and Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1 365 ( 1932) with Dodd, For
Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REv. l 145 ( 1932 ) . For more recent views,
see Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governa·nce System to
Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U. C .L.A. L. REV. 343 ( 1 981 ) .
Courts have taken such nonstockholder interests into account i n sustaining manage
ment action not in the stockholders' best interests. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. &awell, 472 F.2d
1081 ( l O th Cir. 1972) , sustaining management action to avoid a ta keover on t h e ground that
the target 's business of publishing a newspaper made it a "quasi-public institution" with
"other obligations besides the making of a profit." Jd. at 1094-95. The case is criticized by
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 145, at 1 192: "A manager responsible to two conflicting
interests is in fact answerable to neithe r . "
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ary protections work a t cross-purposes with the bond contract's sys
tem of risk allocation while resulting in a minimal flow of benefits to
the bondholders, once more confirming the relative insignificance of
the creditor interests at stake. Thus, the practical sup p orts to the
black letter barrier return to the fore and force strict delimitation of
the scope of any issuer-bondholder fiduciary obligation.

a. Fiduciary duties vs. bond contract terms
Let us take management's investment and dividend policy as a
test case for an issuer fiduciary duty. Stockholder and b ondholder
interests are in harmony concerning new investment out of retained
earnings so long as the net present value of proj ected returns on the
issuer' s investments exceeds the issuer's cost of capital. B ut when
such value falls below the issuer's cost of capital their interests con
flict, with noninvestment and dividends promoting the stockhold
ers' interests, and retained earnings and investment p romoting the
bondholders' interests. 2 5 3 The law sends a contradictory signal if it
imposes a corporate law duty on management to maximize stock
holders' returns and a fiduciary duty on the corporation owing to the
bondholders. Unless resolution of the conflict is left to manage
ment's discretion, the law must go a step further and direct that one
or the other duty be given priority.
Let us assume that the bondholder duty is granted p riority over

the stockholder duty. In order for this bondholder duty to have any
meaningful protective effect in the dividend and investment area, it
must include a license for judicial avoidance of bond contract provi
sions. The standard form permits cash dividends out of surplus.
Given the prevalence of retained earnings financing, such a dividend
could destroy the value of the conversion privilege. Thus, a b ond
holder duty appears to sanction judicial avoidance of bond contract
terms.
Fiduciary duties have an inherent tendency towards contract
avoidance. One reason the law creates them is to restrain p ossibili
ties for abuse in relationships where one party d ominates events be
cause of its superior knowledge, and because the other p arty de
pends on it to make judgments in that party's best interests. 2 5 4
Vvith such a fundamental imbalance of power, a contract fixing the
terms of the relationship so as to benefit the dominant party will be
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inherently suspect. Since the existence of a fiduciary relationship
also tends to imply that market controls will not deter overreaching
by the dominant party, one cannot look to market controls to re
strain overreaching by the contract's drafter.
But, thus stated , the general case for avoiding contract terms
conflicting with fiduciary duties begins to state a case against grant
ing fiduciary protections to convertible bondholders in the first
p lace. None of these general justifications for fiduciary avoidance of
contract terms fully apply here. Furthermore, under a regime of
bondholder protective contract interpretation, contract avoidance
is the sole practical function which a bondholder fiduciary duty
could perform. The standard form bond contract, as protectively
construed by the courts, would provide an authoritative source of all
of the relationship ' s terms, incidentally achieving all of the gap-fill
ing efficiencies which fiduciary duties bring to other corporate
relationships .
Under this functional analysis, the case for making an issuer
duty to convertible bondholders a strict fi duciary duty , comparable
to that of an agent to its principal, becomes a restatement of the case
for avoiding convertible bond contract terms. Like the avoidance
case, the fiduciary case is more or less compelling depending on the
bondholder in view. We see the less compelling case by focusing on
the well-informed bondholders. They neither lack knowledge nor de
pend on the issuer. We see a more persuasive case if we focus on the
uninformed bondholders. But , despite the change in doctrinal con
text , the practical matters at stake remain precisely the matters at
stake with contract law avoidance . 2 5 5 The same considerations con
tinue to counsel respect for the integrity of the bond contract.
To sum up, let us return to the case of the issuer's investment
and dividend policy, and assume that the issuer owes a primary fidu
ciary duty to the bondholders. Under the above ana.lysis the issuer
nevertheless should be free to declare cash dividends for the stock
holders' benefit because the bond contract amounts to a waiver of
the bondholder' s rights as beneficiaries of the duty and no compel
ling justification for avoiding the waiver exists. If we change as
sumptions and make the stockholder duty the primary one, it re
mains equally difficult to see how a dividend could violate the duty
to the bondholders. And even if the bond contract is silent about
dividends, all matters relevant to a determination of whether the
dividend harms

a

bondholder interest worthy of legal protection

come to bear in the contract interpretation inquiry. Finally, if the

255.

See supra notes 21 6-2:3 and accompanying text.

WI SCO N SIN LAW R E V I E W

738

relative priorities o f the bondholder and stockholder duties were left
to case by case determination, we again find ourselves restating
cases of bond contract interpretation and avoidance . Subordinating
the duty to the b ondholders would amount to the same thing as re
fusing to avoid the contract. As with contract avoidance under con
tract doctrine, the ultimate choice is between the bond contract and
contrary judicial notions of fairness.

b. Fiduciary duties vs. contract law duties
Under the above analysis an issuer fiduciary duty to b on dhold
ers is indistinguishable from contract. interpretation informed by a
good faith duty. 2 5 6 While the duties in theory originate in different
p laces-the contract law duty in the particular contract's bundles of
promises and conditions, and the fiduciary duty in the issuers' exer
cise of judgment over the bondholders' investment-they become
functionally identical so long as the bond contract is granted pri
macy over judicial fairness notions as the source of the relationship 's
rights and duties. B oth duties justify bondholder protective filling in
of contractual interstices and perhaps a generalized duty to d isclose,
but do nothing more.
Duplicative legal routes to the same destination, while untidy,
hardly are unusual and often coexist without causing apparent
harm. Perhaps the fiduciary route nevertheless ought to be closed off

here because it creates an unnecessary risk of diverting judges to the
wrong destination altogether.
The convertible bond relationship presents an area of overlap
between contract and fiduciary restraining principles. O utside of the
overlap, contract and fiduciary duties go off in different directions,

with fiduciary duties centering on protection of the dependent party
and contract duties centering on the effectuation of the parties' allo
cation of risks. Fiduciary duties such as those between attorney and

client, partners, brokers and customers, and even management and
corporation, tend to impose a higher degree of selflessness than is
imposed on contracting parties subj ect to the good faith duty. In
general, the fiduciary must put the beneficiary's interests ahead of
his

ov1n

even though the costs to the fiduciary exceed the b enefits to

the beneficiary. In contrast, under a good faith approach the party
under the duty need only give equal consideration to the other
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party's interests, placing them ahead of his own only where the bal
ance of costs and benefits gives primacy to the other's interests. 2 5 7
A court treating a contractual relationship too easily might be
led to an erroneous avoidance of an unobjectionable contractual al
location of risk, by a rhetoric of selflessness that originated regard
ing very different fiduciary relationships. Such was the result in
Zahn 2 5 8 where the court's erroneous restraint of the exercise of call
rights resulted from too strict a focus on fiduciary concerns.
In sum , the strain of bending fiduciary principles to fit the con
vertible bond context creates a risk of over-protecting bondholders.
Since the results of the effort only duplicate results obtainable
through contract law analysis, and since contract law provides a
more precise set of analytical tools for resolving conflicts between
issuers and bondholders, 2 5 9 the courts ought to abandon this partic
ular experiment in fiduciary protection .

CONCLUSION

This Article examines judicial intervention in the convertible
bond relationship to resolve issuer-bondholder conflicts, bringing to
bear a detailed description of the relationship 's economic and con
tractual structure. Three different d octrinal frameworks for judicial
intervention are evaluated: contract interpretation, contract avoid
ance and corporate fiduciary duty.
Significant judicial intervention in the relationship occurs in the
framework of contract interpretation due to residual imperfections
in governing contract provisions. Interpreting judges employing
neoclassical concepts of interpretation enj oy surprisingly wide dis
cretion to make law for the relationship . This Article suggests that
this discretion be restricted under a norm of bondholder protection.
The norm is proposed as a moral response to the issuer opportunism
and bondholder vulnerability underlying issuer-bondholder con
flicts. Of course, economic theory-in particular the efficient mar-�
kets point-implies a very different moral response. But, at least in
the convertible bond context, the theory's moral force dissipates
upon its application to complex real world relationships. Transac-
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tion cost scrutiny similarly fails to yield a compelling result in this
context . When inadequacies appear in contract provisions gov
erning publicly issued bonds, real world costs and benefits lead to
private solutions and render instrumentalist jurisprudence under
the efficiency norm unnecessary.
Aggressive jud icial intervention in the relationship in the
frameworks of contract avoidance and corporate fiduciary duty oc
curs occasionally but persistently. Such intervention draws on the
fiduciary rhetoric characterizing most judicial intervention against
opportunism in corporate relationships. But such fiduciary rhetoric
implies a norm of issuer selflessness potentially conflicting with the
elaborate system of issuer restraints and issuer freedoms contained
in bond contracts. The efficiency norm counsels against such costly
conflict. Therefore, this Article suggests retreat to the less intense
good faith rhetoric of contract law.

